In view of the widespread criticism directed at local, district and metropolitan municipalities for≈failing to deliver on its developmental mandate and Constitutional obligations, it was clearly necessary to undertake a survey to probe the effectiveness of municipal councillors in meeting their responsibilities to provide oversight to ensure successful service delivery and accountability. In this regard, the 2022 National Treasury Diagnostic Review rightly asked:

Finding an answer to this question requires both a systemic analysis of the state of local governance and a more detailed micro assessment of the institutional functioning of individual municipal councils.

The purpose of this article is to report on the findings of an empirical survey conducted among a sample of 20 local, district, and metropolitan municipalities to determine whether municipal councillors have the necessary capacity and tools to conduct their oversight role. Based on the findings, appropriate strategies and practices are recommended for improving the effectiveness of councillors in conducting their oversight roles.

The legislature initiates government supervision, which enables proactive interfacing intended to hold the state’s executive structures responsible for properly and diligently carrying out their duties to enhance the achievement of established government objectives (National Treasury 2005; Parliament 2013). Such oversight has to be exercised by municipal councillors in respect of their municipalities. Section 151 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 makes provision for the transfer of oversight powers and functions to municipal councils (RSA 1996). This places council committees at the forefront of guaranteeing accountability of the administration of a municipality (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 2009).

If oversight is flawed or weak, accountability and responsiveness are significantly weakened (Masiya, Davids & Mangai 2021; Mazibuko & Fourie 2017). Oversight committees should therefore use all the tools available to avoid wasteful expenditure or misuse of public funds; they must also ensure that public officials conduct themselves in a lawful and appropriate manner (Van Der Waldt 2015). This oversight role is often interpreted as oversight conducted only by opposition parties, usually with the intention to ‘police’ and ‘expose’ maladministration and corruption. However, this is a misconception, given the broad oversight obligations of councillors as prescribed by national legislation. Oversight committees must use appropriate monitoring and surveying tools to make sure that public resources and funds are not used wastefully. As such, oversight committees play an essential role to facilitate clean audits and to prevent a repetition of any matters accentuated in the Auditor-General’s report for a preceding period.

In addition to the supervision duties of political office holders, there are other committees with oversight responsibility for municipal administration. The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (MSA), 117 of 1998, establishes the oversight roles and duties of Section 79 and Section 80 committees, which include mayoral committees, council portfolio committees, municipal public accounts committees and audit committees (RSA 1998).

Mokgari and Pwaka (2018:15) point out that ‘the separation of roles between the Council and Administration is intended to enhance the oversight function of Councillors, in ensuring accountability by the Executive’. Furthermore, the Local Government: Municipal Financial Management Act (MFMA) 56 of 2003 assumes a separation between councillors who serve on the Executive (which includes the Executive Mayor or Executive committee and non-executive councillors) from those who serve in the Legislature (RSA 2003). This division of powers is crucial to ensuring that local government continues to exercise its supervision role over the accomplishment of specific and identified duties as well as the powers granted to the executive mayor and all executive committees.

Section 73 of the MSA also provides for the establishment of ward committees, with the objective of enhancing participatory democracy in municipal affairs (RSA 1998). Ward committees are established in the Office of Speaker and are an important type of committee, because ward committees are well suited to hold the executive to account and to deepen democracy, as 9 of the 10 members on such a ward committee are supposed to be community members. Ward committees engage municipal council by means of ward councillors, and are entitled to make recommendations on matters affecting wards. According to De Vries (2018), Ndevu (2019) and Seitlholo (2016), ward committees are key organs of public accountability and instruments to enhance participatory democracy, as these people’s committees are considered impartial, independent and popular. However, ward committees have largely failed to become a conduit for community and citizen participation. Gumede (2021) points out that violent public protests are indicative of the fact that ward committees are not adequate channels to express community concerns and frustrations.

At a systemic level, it is evident that a lack of effective oversight and accountability in the local sphere of government undermines the legitimacy of municipalities and leaves room for political interference and administrative malpractice (Mamokhere, Musitha & Netshidzivhani 2021:2). An analysis of international best practice as reflected in the reports of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Public Management Committee (PUMA) reveals that in countries where service delivery levels and municipal governance levels are low, the statutory and regulatory frameworks of those countries have failed to provide lasting solutions to a lack of professionalism, low levels of competency and inadequate accountability and transparency. The absence of consequence management also leads to unethical conduct, resulting in high levels of corruption and malpractice. If this situation is left unchecked, it ultimately inculcates a systemic culture of poor service delivery and an inappropriate professional ethos (National School of Government 2022). The reality of this situation in South Africa calls for an investigation into the role and effectivity of councillors in exercising oversight and in deepening democracy.

A qualitative research design was chosen in this study. A questionnaire was used for data collection purposes to probe the perceptions of four target groups regarding municipal councillor capacity, and the tools councillors can use to conduct their oversight role. The questionnaire was developed and piloted (pre-tested) with a small sample from each target group. It contained both closed-ended questions (with a single response, using a five-point Likert scale) and open-ended questions. The questionnaire was completed online. A potential limitation of the survey was that there were no guarantees that the intended recipient completed the questionnaire. However, this limitation was mitigated by directing the survey directly to the email of the recipient and a declaration inserted on the questionnaire that the correct person indeed completed it. The survey was subject to rigorous ethical clearance procedures and included voluntary participation of participants, anonymity, and confidentiality of responses. The responses obtained from the respective cohorts were triangulated to obtain a more holistic perspective regarding the nature and scope of municipal oversight.

The survey component of the study entailed selecting local, district, and metropolitan municipalities (N = 257) to be representative of urban and rural settings, low- and high-capacity municipalities and geographical location in the nine provinces. Definitions for ‘low-’ and ‘high-capacity’ municipalities are outlined in the accounting standards set by the Accounting Standards Board in terms of Section 91(4) of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (Government Gazette No. 26511). A list of purposively sampled municipalities was compiled. Thereafter, four metropolitan municipalities, eight district and eight local municipalities (n = 20) were randomly selected from this list.

To identify sufficient respondents for the required sample for Target Groups 1 to 3 (see Table 1), the databases of current standing committees in local provincial government structures were obtained from official websites. Possible respondents were identified from each of the target groups. Every attempt was made to ensure a broad geographic spread across all nine provinces. During the initial process to establish contact, the correct municipal appointment status and current contact details of each potential respondent were verified. Some sampled municipalities required an additional formal request to be provided to the City or Municipal Manager before the contact details of sampled respondents were made available. Respondents were then contacted telephonically and electronically by means of an official email that included the information letter approved by the Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority (LGSETA), a request for informed consent to participate, and the questionnaire.

In order to obtain input from local and wider government management experts, both academics and government experts in the field of public administration and local government management were purposively sampled and contacted to obtain their agreement to participate. Once they had agreed in writing to participate, they were sent an official email containing the questionnaire.

The target groups, sample size, and method of data collection are outlined in Table 1 and Table 2.

Upon completion of the data gathering process, the results for the four target groups were collated and analysed. Input from the selected local government experts was used to confirm and validate the data as analysed, as well as to strengthen recommendations on current and future oversight competencies.

Data analysis entailed coding and thematically analysing the responses to the open-ended questions using Atlas.ti (Version 22) software, managing missing values and correcting and validating data.

A correlation analysis was conducted of the cohort responses to the municipal oversight and capacity-related questions. No statistically significant differences were found between the groups. This finding is constructive, as it shows that the chairpersons of the Section 79 oversight committees, the chairpersons of the standing and/or portfolio committees, as well as those of the provincial SCOPAs, and the local government experts have a common understanding of the competencies and skills required from municipal councillors to fulfil their oversight role towards deepening democracy at local government level.

The following factors that limit the capacity of councillors in conducting their oversight responsibilities were identified:

Council members’ widespread incapacity to understand technical project reports substantially hinders their ability to carry out their oversight duties. These papers include feasibility studies, environmental effect analyses and budget estimates and calculations. It is encouraging to learn that numerous capacity-building initiatives have been launched by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) and National and Provincial Treasuries with the goal of providing all councillors, both new and experienced, with the necessary knowledge and abilities for their positions. However, it appears that these activities fall short of appropriately addressing the wide range of issues required for oversight committees to operate effectively.

Nearly half (42.3%) of respondents regarded the levels of councillors’ current competence in carrying out their oversight function as ‘average’, while 25.0% provided a positive assessment of ‘good’, and 21.1% rated the levels as ‘poor’. The majority of local government specialists voiced concern about the effectiveness of the current oversight capability and gave councillors ‘very poor’ ratings for their roles and competence. Of those polled, 14% said that success and skill levels differ between municipalities, as well as between metro and local municipalities and municipalities in different regions (urban vs. rural). Areas of concern raised included:

The presence of former mayors in oversight committees and the fact that knowledge is being shared between more experienced and less experienced council members were both cited as beneficial contributions. Participants also mentioned the relatively high levels of dedication of some council members and their focus to promoting the efficient operation of oversight committees as encouraging aspects of oversight. The usage of ‘study groups’ among council members to make sure they are fully prepared for meetings and the ongoing dissemination of information and knowledge prior to oversight sessions are two particularly positive aspects. Respondents also indicated that as new groups of councillors mingle and work with existing councillors, such interaction leads to a transfer of insight and skills. Where questions are regularly posed to the administration and that these are usually promptly answered, and where unacceptable answers are ‘red-flagged’ and even forwarded to the Auditor-General for scrutiny, these are further positive developments. It is interesting that 54.5% of councillors indicated that they preferred to do on-site, physical inspections ‘to be seen in the community as doing their jobs’.

Based on the views obtained from the respective target groups, the following strategies and practices are recommended as appropriate for improving the effectiveness of councillors in conducting their oversight roles.

It is evident that municipal councillors play a critical role in overseeing the actions of local government and deepening local democracy. They must serve as representatives of their constituencies to ensure that the voices of their communities are heard and that their interests are represented in decision-making processes. Through their oversight role, councillors have to ensure that public funds are used appropriately, that local government services are delivered efficiently and effectively and that the rights of citizens are protected. They also monitor the implementation of policies and programmes, holding local officials accountable for their actions.

In order to deepen local democracy, councillors should work to engage citizens in the democratic process, encouraging them to participate in decision-making and ensuring that their concerns are addressed. They must also promote transparency and openness in local government, building trust between citizens and officials and fostering a culture of accountability, thereby developing strong, vibrant and inclusive communities. Council members are crucial in advancing the welfare of municipal communities and enhancing local democracy by ensuring that councils are responsive, responsible and representative. When council members, particularly ward councillors, are given the authority to effectively use their oversight structures and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the performance of municipalities, transparency in municipal governance will be improved. This will build trust and legitimacy, which could promote the involvement of communities in municipal processes. However, council members need more specialised and targeted skills, especially when it comes to the challenges of participatory democracy, financial oversight mechanisms, oversight structures, local government law and supply chain management processes. In addition, clarity should be obtained regarding the role that councillors perceive they should play within the arena of oversight (i.e. role perception) and their actual actions to promote oversight (i.e. role behaviour) as these roles are often conflated.