Several media, government, academic and Auditor-General reports have repeatedly echoed the distressing state of municipalities in South Africa. Out of South Africa’s 257 municipalities, 175 of them are in financial distress and on the brink of a crisis (BusinessTech 2022). Similarly, Glasser and Wright (2020) refer to most of South Africa’s municipalities as being financially bankrupt while according to BusinessTech (2022), 151 municipalities are teetering on the brink of collapse and 43 have already collapsed and require urgent intervention to rescue them. Recently, the Auditor-General (2022) indicates that in 2021, the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) reported that 64 municipalities were dysfunctional and unable to deliver services mainly because of poor governance, weak institutional capacity, poor financial management, corruption, and political instability.

As a result, several municipalities across the country have been subjected to, or are currently under intervention, while some are under repeat interventions. Recently, the Auditor-General (2022:4) stated that ‘in June 2021, 23 municipalities were under Section 139 intervention, which further increased to 33 municipalities by February 2022’. Undoubtedly, dysfunctional governance has a consequential effect on the constitutional, functional and institutional integrity of municipalities. Providentially, the Constitution provides for Section 139 through which national and provincial governments are to intervene to preserve the constitutional integrity, functionality and sustainability of the municipality. Section 139 of the Constitution empowers national and provincial governments to intervene in a municipality that cannot or does not fulfil its constitutional and executive obligation. Furthermore, Section 139 of the Constitution prescribes interventions when a municipality fails to approve the budget or revenue-raising measures to give effect to the budget. Section 139(5) of the Constitution provides for provincial intervention:

The criteria for determining serious financial problems are outlined in Section 138 of the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003. Section 138 states that:

Interventions are only activated when normal, non-invasive internal controls, oversight and provincial monitoring and supervision mechanisms have failed to yield positive results (Auditor-General 2021; Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2020). In addition, Ledger and Rampedi (2019) argue that a:

As a mechanism of last resort, the invocation of interventions in a municipality means that self-medicating by municipalities has been ineffective and accordingly, external and intrusive measures are necessary. This view was echoed in the judgement of the Constitutional Court case between the Premier of Gauteng and the Democratic Alliance (2020) which states that intervention is meant to steady the ship. The judgement also states that ‘when the local government breaks down, the Constitution does not leave it to the broken municipality to somehow fix itself’, but provides mechanisms through which the province can intervene to rescue it.

In this regard, an intervention acts as a mechanism to avert a complete and catastrophic collapse of a municipality. It is a temporary annexation of municipal powers by other spheres of government in order to steady the ship, as inferred in the Constitutional Court case between the Premier of Gauteng and the Democratic Alliance (2020). Logically, intervention serves as a backup capability to facilitate short-term recovery and long-term viability and sustainability (Sterbenz et al. 2014). Furthermore, Schillemans (2010) suggests that effective intervention should focus on transforming values and ethics to enable the development of a new culture, behaviour and performance. It is about correcting and preventing behaviour or practices that produced dysfunctionality and failure to perform.

In the context of persistent deleterious municipal fiscal governance and failures, 33 municipalities across the country were placed under interventions (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2023). Procedurally, a financial recovery plan based on criteria prescribed in Section 142 of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) to secure the municipality’s ability to meet its obligations to provide basic services or its financial commitments must be put in place and implemented. The MFMA provides guidelines for the approval, implementation and reporting review of the financial recovery plans (Sections 142 to 147 of the MFMA).

Section 148 of the MFMA provides for the termination of intervention when the municipality is able and willing to fulfil the executive obligation and the financial problem that has been caused by or has caused the failure of the municipality to comply with that obligation is resolved. A broad reading of the requirement to terminate the intervention suggests that the municipality is able to correct and prevent behaviour or practices that produced dysfunctionality, failure and poor performance. It is well documented that financial problems are caused by a lack of effective financial accountability or have caused the failure of the municipality to comply with that obligation (Auditor-General 2017). Thus, an effective intervention must primarily contribute to a re-equilibration of municipal financial accountability with the aim of enabling the self-fortification of fiscal integrity and governance of a municipality. Accordingly, interventions should facilitate a fundamental rebuilding of the robustness, reliability and dependability of municipal financial accountability (Sterbenz et al. 2014). In this way, an intervention will contribute towards curing a municipality of its dysfunctional state, rather than provide a calming effect that does not enable a municipality to recover and fulfil its constitutional objectives and obligations.

Furthermore, an intervention is by design a temporary process and its success depends on its ability to rebuild and strengthen municipal structures and processes to exercise legislative and executive powers, functions and duties. During the National Council of Provinces (virtual) Conference held on 10 September 2020, it was emphasised that interventions require to be carried out in a way that would address the root cause of the challenges, that than what currently appears to simply take-overs that do not ensure sustainable recovery (Parliament 2020). Parliament (2020) also infers that interventions that do not strengthen oversight and accountability are setting municipalities up for future intervention. Similarly, the Auditor-General (2021) has persistently cautioned that the responses to intervention should not be about short-term solutions but efforts to restore accountability. In support, Selepe (2022) adequately captures the essentiality of financial accountability in municipal governance as follows:

In terms of the above, interventions should focus on making a comprehensive contribution that improves the municipality’s own defence and recovery mechanisms. Any contribution that does not strengthen municipal accountability is likely to be ineffective, and this will show in its audit outcomes. The audit outcomes are often used to determine the efficacy of municipal accountability architecture. In this regard, a municipality’s audit opinions, especially, poor (outstanding, disclaimed, adverse opinions) are accountability reports reflecting the ineffectiveness of the institutionalised accountability measures (Auditor-General 2022). Ultimately, the success of interventions in municipalities should reflect in their audit performance.

Notably, the invocation of interventions has become a common feature of governance in South Africa. The South African Local Government Association is concerned about the high number of interventions in municipalities (SALGA 2020). Equally, De Visser and November (2017), Toxopeüs (2019), Ledger and Rampedi (2019), and South Africa Local Government Association (2020) lament the alarmingly high rate of interventions in municipalities. The Constitutional Court has also raised a concern that interventions are becoming a common feature of our democracy (Premier of Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others 2021). Greffrath and Van Der Waldt (2016) argue that the high number of interventions ‘constitutes an identifiable practice in the form of interventionism’.

However, the literature highlights that despite the increasing number of interventions, there are also concerns regarding their effectiveness (Chamberlain & Masiangoako 2021; De Visser & November 2017; Dullah Omar Institute 2021; Ledger 2019; Parliament 2020; Saba 2020). In particular, De Visser and November (2017), Ledger (2019) and Parliament (2020) indicate that interventions in municipalities have not been effective in improving governance and some municipalities are in a worse position after the intervention. According to Parliament (2020), financial challenges of some of the municipalities have become worse after the intervention. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on COGTA also raised a concern regarding Madibeng Local Municipality, which has been subject to four interventions, and none of these interventions have yielded better results (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2020). Equally, Ledger and Rampedi (2019) found that a substantial number of municipalities under intervention are repeat offenders. In addition, Ledger and Rampedi (2019) found that the majority of interventions could not be termed a long-term success. According to Ledger and Rampedi (2019), a significant number of interventions failed to record more than only marginal improvements in the selected indicators such as financial performance, service delivery and financial viability, and most municipalities could not be considered as having recovered to optimal operation. Ledger and Rampedi (2019:13) also found that ‘in some cases, the municipality deteriorated during and after the intervention’. Similarly, the Dullah Omar Institute (2021) highlights that many of these interventions actually fail to bring municipalities back on their feet. Therefore, their effectiveness could be summarised as ineffective (Chamberlain & Masiangoako 2021).

Ledger and Rampedi (2019) attribute the ineffectiveness of interventions to the fact that the underlying problems of dysfunctionality are not being addressed. According to Ledger and Rampedi (2019), the ineffectiveness and dysfunctionality can be attributed to the inability to properly implement the financial recovery plans adopted to secure stability and the ability of the municipality to meet its service delivery and financial obligations and commitments. Furthermore, additional control measures to prevent unauthorised, irregular and to identify any actual and potential revenue sources as required by Section 142 of the MFMA are not adequately implemented. Indications are that the approach to interventions has been more ritualistic than substantial.

In particular, there are widespread concerns that interventions are ineffective in enabling municipalities to address the problem of poor audit outcomes. The Auditor-General (2018) states that the accountability mechanisms in many municipalities are not working as they should and consequently, result in undesirable audit outcomes. According to the Auditor-General (2018:55), the ‘continued lack of accountability failures is the main cause of government failures, which led to a significant regression in audit outcomes’. The Auditor-General (2018) infers authoritatively that the fundamental principles needed to improve audit outcomes include effective accountability, without which, the audit outcomes will not improve to the desired level and accountability authorities will not address one of the root causes of audit findings (Auditor-General 2018). The Auditor-General (2018) points to the entire municipal financial accountability architecture as the problem for poor audit outcomes. According to the Auditor-General (2018), poor audit outcomes result from the failure of senior management, municipal managers and mayors as the first-level assurance providers to address deficiencies in the internal control environment. Similarly, the second and third levels of assurance providers, which include municipal councillors, audit committees and municipal public accounts committees and provincial government departments, are failing to rigorously exercise oversight and monitoring to ensure that there were consequences for those officials responsible for transgressions and poor audit outcomes (Auditor-General 2018). Hence, when addressing the Standing Committee on Auditor-General, the Auditor-General Ms Maluleke stated that interventions have not produced visible success in audit outcomes as expected and have been ineffective in providing solutions to the root causes of challenges faced by municipalities (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2022a).

This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.

Limpopo has a bleak picture of audit performance. Since the beginning of the administration under review, municipalities in this province have failed to exercise the required accountability; hence, non-compliance is a common feature in their audit reports. The intractable financial accountability failures of municipalities in Limpopo are evidenced by poor audit outcomes. For example, no municipality in Limpopo achieved a clean audit for the financial year 2016/2017 (Auditor-General 2018). Again, no municipality in Limpopo achieved a clean audit for the financial year 2017/2018 (Auditor-General 2019). Subsequently, only one municipality received a clean audit in the 2018/2019, 2019/2020 and 2020/2021 financial years (Auditor-General 2022). Table 1 shows the results of Limpopo.

Modimolle-Mookgophong Local Municipality has a history of experiencing financial accountability challenges. The Auditor-General’s reports show that Modimolle-Mookgophong Local Municipality’s financial accountability problems were exposed from 2011 to 2016 (Auditor-General 2016). During this period, Modimolle-Mookgophong Local Municipality aimlessly orbited between outstanding and disclaimed audit opinions (Auditor-General 2016). Observably, the situation has not changed. As the results demonstrate, even placing the municipality under intervention did not help in strengthening the financial accountability architecture; hence, there is no substantial improvement in the audit outcomes. The latest report of the Auditor-General (2022:70) states that ‘Modimolle-Mookgophong continues to be in a vulnerable financial position, having been in this state for 5 years, thus, indicating that interventions deployed at these municipalities were ineffective’.

Equally, Mogalakwena Local Municipality has a perennial problem of financial accountability. The first audit report of Mogalakwena Local Municipality for the financial year 2016/2017 highlights indicates non-compliance (Auditor-General 2018). During the subsequent years leading to the placing of the municipality under intervention, the Mogalakwena Local Municipality has failed to register an improvement in its audit outcome. The results show that during the intervention, the Mogalakwena Local Municipality moved marginally from outstanding to adverse audit opinion. While the audit outcome of the year following the year the municipality was put under intervention shows notable improvement, a qualified opinion with findings still highlights weak and ineffective financial accountability culture and measures. Accordingly, the findings show that the intervention in this municipality failed to ensure that substitutability and backup capabilities inherent in an intervention process were ineffective in strengthening the resilience, and reliability of the financial accountability measures to perform as expected (Sterbenz et al. 2014).

Numerous reports of the Auditor-General have highlighted the acute governance and accountability failures of municipalities in North West. Between the 2016/2017 and 2018/2019 financial years, no municipality in the North West achieved a clean audit (Auditor-General 2022). Only in the 2019/2020 financial year did one municipality receive a clean audit (Auditor-General 2021). However, even this one municipality regressed and no municipality in the North West achieved a clean audit for the financial year 2020/2021 (Auditor-General 2022). These recurring failures demonstrate that municipalities in the North West lack accountability, which is the root cause of the current state of undesirable audit outcomes. (Auditor-General 2020:111). Importantly, 15 out of 22 municipalities have all been placed under administration in the North West Municipality. According to the Auditor-General (2020:114), ‘Section 139 interventions had little impact on the audit outcomes of municipalities in the North West Province’. In addition, the Auditor-General (2020:114) concludes that ‘the misalignment between legislation and the practical implementation of Section 139(1)(b) has failed to realise the benefits of these interventions in restoring governance and the disciplines of financial management’. The results for the North West municipalities are presented in Table 2.

The results in Table 2 show that the audit outcomes of all municipalities did not improve during and after interventions. With regard to the Ditsobotla Local Municipality, the Auditor-General (2019) has been complaining that accountability authorities of the Ditsobotla Local Municipality ‘too little or no action to address the recommendations from the Auditor-General’. It was, therefore, inevitable that the municipality will again be placed under Section 139 intervention in 2022. The analysis of the audit outcomes shows that this municipality has grounded into a disclaimed opinion. Thus, even the efforts of the Section 139 interventions have failed to assist the municipality to avoid its habitual worst audit opinion, indicating that the Section 139 intervention has dismally failed to strengthen its municipal financial accountability.

Equally, Madibeng Local Municipality is regarded as one of the troubled and dysfunctional municipalities in the North West province. According to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2020), the Madibeng Local Municipality has been placed under intervention five times because of political instability, weak financial accountability, maladministration and corruption. A review of the audit reports shows that this municipality has been permanently bottoming at a disclaimed audit opinion between the 2016/2017 and 2020/2021 financial years. These years include 2018/2019 when the municipality was under intervention. The findings suggest that the fundamental flaw in the intervention process to address the non-compliance and governance failures is embedded in neglect of accountability and oversight.

JB Marks Local Municipality is another municipality in the North West province that is widely reported to be experiencing high incidents of fraud, corruption and poor service delivery. The findings in this study show that, even during and after the 2018/2019 Section 139 intervention, did not improve their audit outcomes. This indicator provides further evidence that the Section 139 intervention did not was ineffective in strengthening financial accountability in JB Marks Local Municipality. Quite significantly, the Auditor-General (2020) states that the misalignment between legislation and the practical implementation of intervention failed to restore governance and the disciplines of financial management. More disappointing is that subsequent to the intervention, Parliament (2021) lists Mamusa Local Municipality as one of the dysfunctional municipalities in the North West province. According to Parliament (2021), the recovery plan imposed as part of the intervention was not successful, and Mamusa Local Municipality continues to have a serious problem of poor financial management and monitoring.

Just like many other municipalities in the North West province, Lekwa-Teemane Local Municipality has been having a persistent problem of leadership instability, non-compliance with legislation, no proper record keeping, lack of monitoring tools and lack of internal controls (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2019a). These problems are reflected in the many disclaimed audit opinions received by the municipality during the 5 years under review (Auditor-General 2022). The findings also indicate that the intervention failed to lift the Lekwa-Teemane out of the disclaimed audit opinions. Thus, highlighting that Section 139 intervention has failed to strengthen the financial accountability of Lekwa-Teemane Local Municipality.

Ratlou Local Municipality is also identified as one of the many dysfunctional municipalities in the North West province (Moatshe 2021). The dysfunctionality is demonstrated by the municipality’s inability to improve its disclaimed audit opinion for the entire 5-year period of the previous administration (Auditor-General 2022). The findings show that even the Section 139 intervention imposed on Ratlou Local Municipality during the 2019/2020 financial year failed to yield positive results. Accordingly, the intervention failed to bring change to the problem of failed municipal financial accountability in this municipality.

Tswaing Local Municipality is also one of the municipalities in the North West province that are totally dysfunctional (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2021b). Equally, the findings show that the intervention did not assist the municipality to improve its audit outcomes. The findings provide irrefutable evidence that intervention was ineffective in strengthening municipal financial accountability, hence the failure to improve its audit outcomes.

Oregan (2022) states that the Auditor-General is concerned with the inaction by political and administrative leadership in the Free State for a deliberate obstruction of municipalities’ effective functioning. In particular, the Auditor-General identifies poor financial management disciplines, in-year financial reporting processes and accountability for failing to receive clean audits for 5 years during the previous administration (Oregan 2022). According to the Auditor-General (2019:10), there is a ‘total breakdown in controls and poor leadership response towards improving accountability, which were the main causes of further regressions in the Free State’. The results from the municipalities were presented in Table 3.

Metsimaholo Local Municipality has been subjected to Section 139 intervention twice. This municipality is notorious for spending R21.7 million on the Oranjeville sports complex, which did not exist except for a fence (Auditor-General 2019). The findings show that the intervention did not help to improve the audit outcome of the Metsimaholo Local Municipality. Equally, the results highlight that the intervention did not strengthen accountability. This result confirms the Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s (2021b), assertion that this municipality has also been struggling with regression in audit outcomes and governance oversight, as well as a deterioration of systems of internal controls.

Just like the Metsimaholo Local Municipality, the Mafube Local Municipality was placed under Section 139 intervention twice during the previous administration. The first Section 139 intervention was in the 2016/2017 financial year for struggling to manage its finances for a number of years and subsequently in 2022 because of a court judgement (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2022b). Since the municipality was placed under intervention, its audit outcomes have not improved. These results indicate that the Section 139 intervention has been ineffective in strengthening accountability.

Masilonyana Local Municipality has had a perennial problem of internal controls, financial management and poor audit outcomes (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2021c). According to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2021c), the last time the municipality submitted annual statements for audits was in 2016/2017. Subsequent to the municipality being placed under intervention, the municipality has not improved its audit outcomes. This lack of improvement in audit outcomes provides evidence that the Section 139 intervention was ineffective in strengthening accountability.

The Maluti-a Phofung Local Municipality’s accountability architecture and related governance have been severely unstable and dysfunctional for a protracted period. The Auditor-General (2022:39) reports, that ‘Maluti-a Phofung has also not submitted financial statements for auditing for 4 years’. Similarly, the results of this study indicate that before and after the intervention, the Maluti-a-Phofung Local Municipality’s audit outcome did not improve. The inability to improve audit outcomes indicates deficiencies in municipal financial accountability. These results confirm the Auditor-General (2022:56) infers that ‘poor audit outcomes in municipalities result from a culture of poor accountability’.

Mangaung Metro, like many other municipalities in the Free State, has demonstrated weak governance and political and administrative leadership. According to the Auditor-General (2021), the Mangaung Metro has been flagged as an ongoing concern over a period of 5 years. Equally, the results of this study show that though there was an improvement after the intervention, the municipality was unable to achieve a clean audit. Once more, the results highlight that the intervention failed to strengthen the accountability of the municipality.