Abstract
Background: In post-apartheid South Africa, much has been written about political killings or political assassinations, particularly at the local government level. Many studies carried out on this topic focus mostly on factionalism and internal squabbles within the African National Congress (ANC). Little attention has been paid to the impact of political careerism on political killings at the local government level.
Aim: This article seeks to explore and discuss the impact of political careerism on political killings at the local government level in South Africa.
Methods: The article relied on secondary data from accredited journal articles, scholarly books, official reports, academic dissertations and conference proceedings. A qualitative desktop analysis of data was employed.
Results: Policy recommendations are suggested to remedy political killings and promote peaceful conflict resolution within political parties.
Conclusion: High unemployment and a lack of job opportunities drive individuals, particularly youth, to pursue political careers for economic gain, resulting in conflicts and assassinations.
Contribution: There are two main contributions in this article. Firstly, it underscores how political careerism within the ANC has led to the rise of quasi-politicians who prioritise personal enrichment over development and public service. Secondly, it connects economic conditions to political behaviour. As a result of high unemployment and a lack of entrepreneurial opportunities, the youth, mainly in the ANC, pursue political careers as a path to economic opportunities.
Keywords: African National Congress; local government; political careerism; political killings; strain theory; inequality and crime; political assassinations; South Africa.
Introduction
Politics at the local government level have been characterised by political killings, which hinder basic service delivery. Almost 30 years into democracy, millions of South Africans have no access to basic service delivery. The latter has been worsened by political infighting within the African National Congress (ANC), especially at the local government level. The political infighting within the ANC has yielded political killings or assassinations. Bruce (2013:14) maintains that ‘more of these deaths were in KwaZulu-Natal’ (KZN), and most of the victims are ward councillors and local politicians who belong to the ANC.
There are numerous factors that account for the killing of politicians at the local government level. For example, the pursuit of political power, competition over state resources, job opportunities, and the awarding of tenders have led to political killings. To support this argument, Fukuyama (2019:11) argued, ‘Modern economic theory is built around the assumption that human beings are rational individuals who all want to maximise their utility – that is, their material well-being – and that politics is simply an extension of that maximising behaviour’.
A theoretical lens
The strain theory
American sociologist, Robert Merton (1938:672–673) identifies two phases of the social structure which apply pressure on certain individuals who, out of this pressure, tend to express deviant behaviour and non-conformist conduct. The first phase involves culturally defined interests, purposes and goals. The second involves the institutional or moral imperatives which are sanctioned for individuals to achieve their interests, purposes and goals. These institutional regulations curtail the actions of expedients seeking to achieve their goals outside of the formal and established mechanisms.
As success is socially defined in terms of monetary wealth, the end, being wealthy, holds greater importance than the institutionally or morally sanctioned means or methods of achieving the goal of wealth acquisition; this, then results in anomie and lethargic social integration. For our purposes, social integration means a connection between culturally defined goals and institutional means of attaining those goals. French sociologist, Emile Durkheim ([1897] 1952:219) argues that incessant desire and ambition are emboldened by the beneficial nature of profound social disturbances that provide a financial benefit to the privileged class. This creates erethism (excitement) to boundless accumulation, which is classified as economic anomy. Therefore, the beneficiaries of a social disturbance that is followed by an economic disaster are expedient in the suspension of regulation or institutional norms to amass wealth through unlawful means (Merton 2017:42–43).
The disproportionate emphasis on wealth (as a status symbol) as an indicator of success, which is a culturally defined goal, exerts inordinate pressure on individuals in society to reach this goal through unlawful means. This, according to Merton (1938:675–676), encourages ‘demoralisation’ and ‘deinstitutionalisation’. Therefore, society disintegrates because the link between acquiring goals through institutionally sanctioned means is severed. Crime, criminality, corruption and immorality become widespread because of an over-emphasis on the goal (in this case, monetary wealth) and a corresponding de-emphasis on institutional means of achieving the goal. The strain theory suggests that when individuals in society cannot achieve culturally defined goals, such as wealth or status, through institutional means (education, employment or entrepreneurship) because of fewer economic opportunities and a paucity of resources, this results in a surge in the attainment of these goals through illegitimate means (Durkheim [1897] 1952:212–219; Merton 1938:676).
According to Merton’s (1938:678–679) strain theory, in a society with a differential class structure, the modes of adaptive response to the pressure to achieve culture-defined goals are innovative. That is an acceptance of cultural goals and a disregard or contravention of institutional or moral means of attaining such goals. The innovative response is found in societies with an emphasis on the goal of success, culturally defined in terms of power, wealth, prestige and status without adequate institutional means (quality education, gainful employment or economic opportunity) to achieve that goal. What then happens is that individuals will achieve the goal through illegitimate or unlawful means. Achieving success through institutional means in a society with differential access to legitimate means such as quality education and economic opportunity is not technically effective. This, according to D’Hombres, Weber and Elia (2012), is exacerbated by the anger, frustration and resentment of those who experience economic resource deprivation which results in higher levels of criminal or unlawful activity (Hsieh & Pugh 1993:183).
‘Income inequality and crime’ presents the economic theory linking income inequality to crime, which will buttress the strain theory in terms of political careerism and political killings in South Africa. These issues are partly driven by economic factors, such as access to civil service employment and municipal tenders, or entrepreneurial opportunities, aligning with the main argument of this article. Political killings must be viewed as a result of the upsurge in career politicians which is believed to stem from a lack of economic opportunities coupled with high levels of unemployment which create a conflict of material interests particularly in the governing ANC.
Income inequality and crime
Gary Becker (1968:43–45) presents an economic theory that the higher the income inequality, the higher the probability of violent crime in society. Those at the bottom of the income distribution are viewed as rational decision-makers who find it more rewarding (more to gain – less to lose) to engage in unlawful activities as opposed to the rewards or returns associated with lawful action. These actors believe that the costs associated with an unlawful act are lower than the reward gained from an unlawful act in a highly unequal society. Consequently, in terms of this cost-benefit analysis, the net return from unlawful activity supersedes that of lawful acts. Criminal activity is, therefore, lower in societies with a more even income distribution because the income of those considered at the tail end would be closer to the national average (D’Hombres et al. 2012). Coccia (2017:190) argues that ‘socioeconomic inequality is positively associated with violent crime’. Further to that, there is a direct or proportional relationship between socioeconomic inequality and violent crime. In countries with lower socioeconomic inequality, there are fewer occurrences of violent crime or homicide. The opposite occurs in countries with high levels of socioeconomic inequality and poverty (62.6% in 2022, The World Bank 2023), such as South Africa (Coccia 2017:196–197). Hsieh and Pugh (1993:198) aver that ‘resource deprivation, as indicated by either poverty or income inequality, appears to be more closely associated with homicide and assault’.
As was earlier mentioned, South Africa is confronted by chronic youth (15–34 years) unemployment, which is among the highest globally. According to Statistics South Africa (2023b), in the third quarter, the unemployment rate was 41.2%, in terms of the expanded definition. Youth unemployment is recorded at 43.4% or 4.6 million jobless young people. The Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) 2023 reports that 53.2% of the youth in the third quarter of 2022 were not in employment, education or training (NEET). Valodia (2023) posits that South Africa is also plagued by steep wealth inequality with a Gini coefficient of 0.67. The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (2023) reports that:
50% of South Africans are chronically poor. Only 20% of South Africans belong to the stable middle class, whilst 4% belong to the elite. The rest belong to the transient poor (11%) and the vulnerable middle class (15%). (p. 1)
According to the Corruption Watch 2022 Annual Report, the six-volume State of Capture Commission report reveals endemic corruption which involves both the public and private sectors with an aim of defunding public institutions. The aforementioned is also responsible for the energy crisis in the country, characterised by scheduled power outages commonly known as ‘load-shedding’. This has a domino effect on the economy, particularly business closures, growing unemployment, dilapidating infrastructure, hollowing out of state-owned enterprises (SOE) and inadequate public service delivery (Corruption Watch 2023:4–5).
According to the World Bank (2023), South Africa’s economy contracted to 1.9% in 2022, a fall from 4.7% in the previous year. The economy is still in recovery from the impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and its associated regulations, unending load-shedding, and food and fuel price inflation which have dramatically raised the cost of living. Statistics South Africa (2023a) reports that although the economy saw growth in the first two quarters of 2023, the gross domestic product (GDP) in the country dropped by 0.2% in the third quarter. According to Transparency International’s (2023) Corruption Perception Index, South Africa is ranked 72 out of 180 countries globally in terms of perceived public sector corruption. Sebake and Mudau (2020:493) aver that nepotism and favouritism, maladministration, fraud, bribery and procurement irregularities are the salient motifs of the democratic government, particularly at the local government level (Fraser 2023).
The foregoing is argued to form a firm foundation to anchor the argument that, in such economic conditions, the youth are only left with the option of pursuing a career in politics, mainly in the governing ANC, to occupy party leadership positions and deployment into government, mainly as a municipal ward or proportional representation councillors. This becomes the only viable option for upward social mobility where opportunities are consistently shrinking, and the growth of the economy is anaemic. A political career in the governing ANC is believed to provide access to deployment, employment and economic opportunities. However, economic conditions characterised by unemployment, poverty and inequality coupled with dwindling electoral fortunes for the ANC, consequently intensify intra-party contests for councillors, and these battles often turn deadly, as will be shown in the ‘State resources looting’ section (Mvenene 2023).
Kabanyane (2006:10) observes that municipal public officials such as mayors pay lip service to their constituencies without the intent of delivering on their promises made during election periods; they are mainly concerned with advancing their political careers and maintaining bureaucratic lifestyles which are intertwined with unlawful public resource consumption. The terms ‘politpreneurs’ and ‘tenderpreneurs’ will be defined by Madi (2016) in the ‘Political careerism’ and ‘The politics of new money’ sections. Kabanyane (2006) further asserts that career politicians primarily prioritise themselves, their families and friends, and secondarily consider the plight of the public or the electorate. Matamba (2023:14) reports that political assassinations have been on a consistent upsurge since 2020, with recorded cases increasing annually. There were 24 recorded assassinations in 2020, 30 in 2021, and 40 in 2022. The rise in political killings has a proportional relationship with a deteriorating economy and the diminishing electoral success of the ANC which reduces the number of available seats in municipal councils (Mvenene 2023).
According to a Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) report compiled by Matamba (2023):
[I]n the sphere of politics, positions for local municipal office are highly contested for economic and personal reasons, and targeted killings have increasingly become a common phenomenon of the South African political economy. (p. 5)
Mvenene (2023) espouses that the waning electoral fortunes of the ANC in the 2016 (53.91%) and 2021 (48%) local government elections were accompanied by a rise in political killings induced by fewer available seats in municipal councils and a declining influence on high-value tenders. The upsurge in political killings among competing aspirants inside the ANC in the 2021 election period was actually a struggle for access to municipal finances, mainly through the decentralised procurement system in municipalities. These ill-gotten gains are used for private benefit by unscrupulous public and private actors in concert. Making it to the party list, deployment into public office, and employment in the civil service (municipal managers, chief executive officers, heads of departments and director generals) increases the patronage group’s influence on the direction of high-value municipal tenders. For many emerging companies in the townships and rural areas, access to economic activity is only found through lucrative municipal tenders. Therefore, municipal positions are greatly desired, hence the upsurge in political killings in the 2021 election period as the electoral fortunes of the ANC dwindled (Matamba 2023:18; Mavuso 2023).
It can then be argued that unemployed youth and emerging companies that cannot access employment and economic opportunities would view the ANC, as the governing party, as the only avenue for upward mobility, mainly through deployment as ward councillors or employment as civil servants. Out of this employment, the political principal or the leader of the patronage network deployed into government extends resources in the form of money, tenders, civil service employment, favours or access to information to clients within the network, who are in the main municipal tender-aligned companies, branch and regional party leadership (Mvenene 2023). Madi (2016:27) avers that the term tenderpreneur pertains to a politically connected business class that exerts improper influence on the public actors to unfairly acquire government tenders. Beresford (2015:236) indicates that tenderpreneurship entails the enrichment (not broader empowerment) of a select business class with political influence on actors employed by the government. Tenderpreneurs and municipal-tender-aligned companies should be viewed synonymously. Matamba (2023:17) points out that Siyabonga Mkhize was assassinated in October 2021 after winning the election for party councillor candidate, replacing Mzimuni Ngiba, who had served as councillor from 2011 in KZN’s eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. Ngiba was arrested in May 2022 for the murder of Mkhize. These deadly contestations for making it to the party list are inspired by access to political power, which secures patronage, employment and economic opportunity, mainly through municipal tenders.
Bruce (2013:16a) observed that there have been more killings in KZN compared to other provinces since 1994. Again Bruce (2013:16–17b) goes on to predict that close to 75% of killings have been politically motivated since ‘the period of 2000’ including the assassination of a prominent ANC youth leader Sandiso Magaqa. There is enough evidence which shows that the majority of these killings happen during or just before local government elections. Also, ‘comrades’ are fighting for power and tender opportunities. Matamba (2023:15) espouses that in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, the municipal council has remained hung since the 2021 local government elections. No political organisation has managed to command an absolute majority. As the municipal council is composed of numerous political parties with divergent ideological beliefs, decision-making becomes onerous, and this sometimes results in violence in the council hanging in the balance. The ‘State resources looting’ section will demonstrate the juxtaposition between state resources looting and careerists.
State resources looting
Sebake and Mudau (2020:498) espouse that the ‘looting of resources is apportioned to politics of clientelism and the administrative meddling of tender systems by public representatives’. State resource looting is inspired by insatiable greed and the desire to accumulate wealth and status through unlawful means. State resources looting refers to a situation where political careerists (this concept will be discussed in the ‘Political careerism’ section) hire a ‘hitman’ to kill a particular politician for the looting of state resources at the local government level. State resource looters are interested in material benefits, as opposed to moral incentives, more than anything else. This new economic class emerged out of materialistic interests, corruption and factionalism within the ANC. It is made up of political careerists whose interest is to amass state resources, ignoring issues pertaining to service delivery. Mbeki (1998:297), cited in Makgetlaneng (2002), said that:
Their measure of success is the amount of wealth they can accumulate and the ostentation they can achieve which will convince all that they are a success because, in a visible way, they are people of means…Thus, they seek access to power or access to those who have access to power so that they can corrupt the political order for personal gain at all costs. (p. 54)
The culture of political materialism became the order of the day and not service delivery provision and good governance.
Ginty (2007) ‘conceptualises looting, noting that it is a label rather than a descriptive of a particular type of activity’. Makgetlaneng (2002:185) says that ‘in almost every newly independent African state the class of people who acquired control of government used it as their chief means of accumulating wealth and becoming capitalists’. Likewise, Wallerstein (1988:97) argues that the national bourgeoisie that assumes the reigns of governmental control following political independence seeks to supplant their former oppressors mainly through status, consumption, and lifestyle, but not the economic function of the colonial bourgeoisie. According to Fanon (1963:149–150), these functions include entrepreneurial roles, creating employment, attracting productive investment, invention, innovation, dynamism and maximising profits – new forms of accumulation. In post-apartheid South Africa, resource mobilisers are not capitalists; they mobilise state resources to mimic Western capitalist lifestyles and not to create generational wealth like the Western capitalists do. Most of them are predominantly found in the construction sector (the ‘construction mafia’) at the local government level.
Some critics refer to them as ‘amaBEE’ and ‘Imigodoyi’, which the latter conceptually refers to criminals and thieves. In the construction sector, political killings happen because of competition over tenders and projects. Dolley (2023) observed that:
At least three murders and two attempted murders were carried out in Cape Town last month in a wave of violence that is believed to be linked to gangsterism and lucrative construction tenders, which are in turn connected to politics. (p. 1)
In addition, data collected by the GI-TOC (2022) revealed that:
Construction mafia’s-linked to the ANC’s Radical Economic Transformation (RET) faction, in which former President Jacob Zuma was a key figure-have become notorious for extorting major construction projects in KZN with heavily armed men threatening violence and demanding large fees (usually 30% of the total value of the project) in return for allowing work [to] proceed. (p.71)
So clearly, these are quasi-politicians who are not interested in development but rather interested in enriching themselves. The ‘Political careerism’ section will explore and discuss political careerism within the context of this chapter.
Political careerism
Political careerism is not only unique to South Africa; it also has footprints around the world as well. For instance, in Britain, career politicians ‘have existed in significant numbers at least since the introduction of parliamentary salaries in 1911’. Unlike in Britain, in South Africa, career politicians or political careerism takes place first and foremost at the local government level up to the national government level. Although there is no formal order which explains the political career path, some political careerists begin their political career at university and then escalate to provincial and national government level. As we shall see, there are many reasons resulting in political careerism, which manifests in the killing of politicians at the local government level in South Africa.
For the purpose of this chapter, political careerism is defined as a situation where quasi-politicians are killing each other for economic and financial personal gains. These killings are evident at the local government level because political careerists are busy fighting for tenders, job opportunities, friends, cronies and relatives. In most cases, if not all the time, political killings have little to do with policy differences, ideological differences or strategies and tactics for development in general. They are motivated by self-interests and factional material greed. Corruption and looting of state resources are at the centre of political careerism (ed. Butler 2010:16; Matamba 2023:17).
Going back to Britain, a German sociologist, Weber (1948: 84–6), cited in King (2015:61–62a), suggested that there are two overlapping categories of politicians: ‘those politicians who lived for politics and those politicians who lived off politics’. According to Weber (1948:84–86), cited in King (2015):
Those politicians who lived for politics had it as their vocation, calling their profession to which they were dedicated one in which they could find personal fulfilment. Those who lived off politics participated in political life simply, and more prosaically, as a way of earning their living. (p. 61b)
In this context, ‘those who lived off politics’ can be referred to as political careerists because their intention is to amass state resources through corruption and a tender system by killing. In South Africa, political careerism can be referred to as a practice of finding a political home or a party to build one’s political career because he or she does not have the necessary qualification(s) or skills to enter a formal labour market. So, a political network becomes a necessary channel to secure a political career. To support this argument, Makgetlaneng (2002:136) argues that after Thabo Mbeki was recalled by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC as its party president, some who remained ANC members went to Jacob Zuma ‘for them to be rewarded with positions’ because they cannot find jobs outside the ANC or in government. Nyoka (2001:86a) posits that ‘the foundations of every society are economic’. Nyoka (2001:86b) goes on to say, ‘for people to survive, they have to provide themselves with goods and services’. In this context, people will kill each other for personal survival at all costs.
According to Madi (2016:28–29), a ‘politpreneur’ refers to individuals who join politics or, specifically, the ANC with the sole purpose of accessing public resources in order to advance their private or commercial interests through public resource plunder. This certain kind of politician is referred to as an opportunist or careerist in which service delivery is permanently deferred. This term is closely related to lobbying, as seen in Washington; however, in the South African case, the person doing the lobbying stands to benefit directly from influencing the process and the direction of the awarding of a municipal tender. The ‘politpreneur’ may be the owner or partially owns the business that will receive the tender because of their intervention. The term also conflates with political rent-seeking in the context of politically connected businesspeople employing questionable tactics or influencing corrupt public actors to win a tender regardless of a better business alternative.
From a Marxist point of view, the material conditions of the black majority population have not changed since 1994 in South Africa. Race, not class, remains the same in terms of economic domination and wealth. Gumede (2015:230) affirms that ‘not much has changed about the structure of the South African economy after apartheid’. Further to this, Mpofu-Walsh (2017:2) notes that ‘…wealth inequality in South Africa dwarfs income inequality, which is already the world’s worst’. In addition, the black population owns no measurable portion of South African wealth. From an inequality point of view, wealth inequality and income inequality are still prevalent within the African and coloured populations. Since 1994, the majority of these groups have been relatively deprived of economic opportunities (Mbeki & Mbeki 2016:2). Kotze (2015:257–258) insists that the notion of race is a crucial marker of political, social and economic inequality in South Africa. Particularly observable is the socioeconomic concentration of poverty in the black population (Africans, Indians and coloureds). However, political careerists have not mastered the art of economic transferability from one generation to the next for generational wealth purposes (Wallerstein 1988:104).
Political killings pose a threat to national security, development and sustainability. In the main, political careerism exists for individuals to amass state resources. Who gets what and when becomes the strategy for the survival of the fittest. In this regard, human beings are naturally born to maximise their economic power and self-interests at all costs. On the contrary, a Hegelian view asserts that ‘human beings are morally free agents who are not simply rational machines seeking to maximise satisfaction of their desire’ (Fukuyama 2019:39). The latter view is unrealistic as we have witnessed an increase in politicians being killed for political reasons at local government level. The main emphasis here is that the root cause of political killings in local government is not only factionalism within the ANC but also the culture of political careerism supported by corruption within the ANC. Mbeki and Mbeki (2016:8–9) posit that the Auditor General’s (AG) reports reveal unauthorised and wasteful expenditures annually, presided over by public officials and civil servants, mainly at the local government level, in an effort to unduly self-enrich. The foregoing postulations are in concordance with Merton’s (1938:678–679) strain theory and the innovative responses or adaptations to social pressure to achieve culturally defined goals. The ‘Political killings’ section focusses on instances of political killings.
Political killings
There is a school of thought that points out a direct relationship between factionalism and corruption within the ANC and political killings at the local government level in South Africa. Some suggest that factionalism and corruption lead to political killings. This school of thought explains that those who are not involved or refuse to be involved in corruption activities become the victims of political killings, including whistle-blowers. For instance, Arde (2020:255) is of the opinion that ‘Political killings occur frequently in KZN as a result of contestation for tenders and government contracts from different factions within the party’. Nomarwayi et al. (2020) add that ‘The phenomenon of political killings in KZN is caused by lack of provincial leadership, battle for power and internal factions within the ANC structures in that province, dubbed as killing fields.’ Furthermore, Moerane (2018) commission found that ‘there does not seem to be any reduction in the rate of the murder of politicians in KZN. There is something rotten in the province of KZN’. Also, there is an economic aspect to these political killings. For instance, ‘hitmen’ are hired and get paid to kill a targeted victim for a politically motivated reason.
It is important to note that KZN is among the four poorest provinces in South Africa, with the second-largest unemployment rate (SABC News 2023). Interestingly, Shaw and Thomas (2017) add that ‘hitmen’ are also deeply symptomatic of the broader challenges of corruption and rent-seeking in South Africa, particularly at local and provincial levels. Figure 1 shows political targeted killings per province in the period 2021 to 2022. The vertical axis shows the number of recorded assassinations, while the horizontal axis shows the number of assassinations in South Africa’s nine provinces.
 |
FIGURE 1: Political targeted killings per province, 2021–2022. |
|
In a different context, there is the hiring of ‘hitmen’ outside the political space; ‘hitmen’ are hired to kill a targeted individual. For example, the shooting of Kiernan Jarryd Forbes, otherwise known as ‘AKA’, is an indication of the commercialisation of killings, and the ‘hitmen’ economy. Still, in a different context, the police are also the victims of assassinations in South Africa. Some of the victims are killed while still on duty by unknown ‘hitmen’. Other victims of the ‘hitmen’ shooting are the whistleblowers who are involved in high criminal cases and corruption activities; take, for example, the killing of Babita Deokaran on 29 April 2023, a well-known whistleblower (Matamba 2023:18).
It should be noted that the ANC is a diverse political organisation, and its members have different material interests. So, as the organisation with a ‘diverse constituency’, the ANC, ‘as the governing party and the national liberation movement will continue facing challenges in managing its internal contradictory and antagonistic interests, needs and demands’, argues Makgetlaneng (2022:261). Writing on the removal of former president Thabo Mbeki in Polokwane 2007, Chikane (2016:182a) observed that ‘He (Mbeki) missed the point that during the new dispensation the ANC cadres had changed in terms of self-interests’. Chikane (2016:182b) supports this notion of a ‘diverse constituency’ within the ANC. Consequently, diverse constituencies yield diverse factions, and competition over resources emerges. The latter resulted in political killings, particularly at the local government level; the notion of ‘it’s our time to eat’ became a dominant factor within some of the ANC members, locally and nationally. To support this argument, Friedman (2010:162–163) argues that the contest for political and public office intensified during the Jacob Zuma presidency (2009–2018). The fierce factional struggles were not ideologically inspired as the public may be led to believe. Whichever faction won intra-party elections, the public lost. This is because the ultimate goal of these factions is to plunder public resources for private gain. The will of the people or the public’s concerns in the form of efficient service delivery is not embodied by warring factions. To better understand the above discussion, it is important to briefly analyse the politics of new money within the context of this chapter. The section titled ‘The politics of new money: A brief analysis’ examines the politics surrounding new money.
The politics of new money: A brief analysis
The politics of new money in the post-apartheid dispensation has been caused by corruption, tribalism, factionalism, race and identity. Also, the failure of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) prompted the politics of new money. Both the former and the latter points are based on a similar principle because tribalism, factionalism, race and identity have enriched a selected few politically connected within the ANC; while BEE benefited the few in the ANC because it was introduced under Thabo Mbeki’s leadership (1998–2008). McKinley (2017:43) and Mvenene (2022:49) concur that during Mbeki’s presidency, it was conceived that racial capitalism could be best fought by the existence of a black capitalist class. Thus, failure to create this new class of historically disadvantaged capitalists would mean the ANC had failed to achieve its historic mission.
Critics of BEE, such as Madikizela-Mandela (2013), said the following about BEE:
Black economic empowerment is a joke. It was a white confidence measure made up by local white capitalists. They took malleable blacks and made them partners. But those who had struggled and had given blood were left with nothing. They are still in shacks: no electricity, no sanitation and no sign of an education. (p. 10)
Southall (2004) avers that:
Moeletsi Mbeki, the President’s brother, has declared BEE a sham, dreamed up by white capital to seduce the ANC away from nationalising the economy and hence to produce a predatory black elite. (p. 313)
In my opinion, the majority of beneficiaries of BEE are predominantly exile returnees, and some of the inxile remainees were either sidelined or ignored. Therefore, who gets what and when, ‘it’s our time to eat’, and ‘get rich get rich!’ became the order of the day. One of the consequences of this dynamic is that it gave birth to political careerists and quasi-politicians within the ANC in all three spheres of government. At a local government level, the politics of new money plays a significant role in the formation of the new economic class and the creation of political careerists. So, competition for money and power became rife and political killings increased rapidly.
According to Madi (2016:27), the other side of the coin is that BEE has been maliciously used by certain (not all) black aspirant entrepreneurs in South Africa, namely ‘tenderpreneurs’. The term tenderpreneur pertains to a politically connected business class that uses influence on the government to unfairly acquire tenders. This is done by public officials and private actors to unlawfully accumulate wealth. Tenderpreneurship entails the enrichment, not broader empowerment, of a select business class with political influence on actors employed by the government (Beresford 2015:236). To remedy the situation of political killings instigated by political careerists at the local government level, this chapter suggests the following policy recommendations.
Policy recommendations
- Government must ensure that the tender system policy follows proper procedures, not favouritism to ‘comrades’, friends, relatives, cronies and so on.
- Government must ensure that the South African Police Service (SAPS) is equipped with high-quality intelligence personnel to curb political killings.
- Government must ensure that ward councillors are equipped and prepared with skills and training for at least finding better job opportunities.
- Communities should work side by side with the police to assist with criminal acts.
- The government must introduce strict laws for people who own illegal firearms.
- There must be tough jail sentences for those who are hired as hitmen for political killings by political careerists.
- The government must insulate the civil service from politics; in other words, the civil service must be professionalised and de-politicised.
- Political party leadership structures must be charged with the responsibility to inculcate a culture of peaceful internal conflict resolution, particularly after branch meetings in which councillor candidates are elected.
- Section 158 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 should be amended to require a university qualification, preferably in municipal legislation, decision-making and local government finance, as a prerequisite for serving on the municipal council. This change is essential for transforming the perception that a political career is merely an option for the uneducated and those struggling to find employment in the formal sector.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to explore and discuss the impact of political careerism on political killings at the local government level. This chapter has shown that political killings of ward councillors at the local government level hinder service delivery which results in violent service delivery protests. It is evident that lethargic economic growth coupled with a lack of job and entrepreneurial opportunities triggers a culture of political careerism. This argument was framed using the strain theory and further buttressed by the theory of income inequality and crime. Political careerism in this chapter refers to the emergence of people who participate or take part in political activities to amass state resources through tender systems as well as in the construction sector. Who gets what and when is what triggers political killings in South Africa. Political careerists are also referred to as ‘amaBEE’ or ‘Imigodoyi’ and these criminals will do anything to get access to state resources, even if it means killing. Most of these political killings occur in KwaZulu-Natal, but they also happen in other provinces. It is important to note that ‘hitmen’ are often hired to carry out these killings. Additionally, many of these political murders take place in the construction sector and, to some extent, in housing projects.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the insightful input of colleagues, friends and family, which significantly enhanced the article.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.
Authors’ contributions
T.N. contributed to the conceptualisation, writing and supervision. M.M. contributed to the conceptualisation, writing and visualisation.
Ethical considerations
This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
The authors confirm that the data used in this study are available within the article (see in-text citations and the reference list).
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and are the product of professional research. It does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency or that of the publisher. The authors are responsible for this article’s results, findings and content.
References
Arde, G., 2020, War party: How the ANC’s political killings are breaking South Africa, Tafelberg, Cape Town.
Becker, G.S., 1968, ‘Crime and punishment: An economic approach’, Journal of Political Economy 76(2), 169–217. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62853-7_2
Beresford, A., 2015, ‘Power, patronage, and gatekeeper politics in South Africa’, African Affairs 114(455), 226–248. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu083
Bruce, D., 2013, ‘A provincial concern: Political killings in South Africa’, SA Crime Quarterly 45, 13–24.
Butler, A. (ed.), 2010, Paying for politics: Party funding and political change in South Africa and the global South, Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg.
Chikane, F., 2016, The Thabo Mbeki I Know, eds. S.M. Ndlovu and M. Strydom, Picador Publishers, Johannesburg.
Coccia, M., 2017, ‘A theory of general causes of violent crime: Homicides, income inequality and deficiencies of the heat hypothesis and of the model of CLASH’, Aggression and Violent Behavior 37, 190–200. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2017.10.005
Corruption Watch, 2023, Accelerating justice: Corruption Watch 2022 annual report, viewed 04 December 2023, from https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Corruption-Watch_Report_Final_4April.pdf.
Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), 2023, Persons who are not in employment, education or training (NEETS), viewed 22 November 2023, from https://www.dhet.gov.za/Planning%20Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation%20Coordination/Fact%20Sheet%20-%20NEETs_%20March%202023.pdf.
D’Hombres, B., Weber, A. & Elia, L., 2012, Literature review on income inequality and the effects on social outcomes, JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, viewed 10 December 2023, from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Beatrice-Dhombres/publication/303709121_Literature_review_on_income_inequality_and_the_effects_on_social_outcomes/links/574ef3dd08aeb3269ef0cd7d/Literature-review-on-income-inequality-and-the-effects-on-social-outcomes.pdf.
Dolley, C., 2023, ‘Spate of shootings in Cape Town last month in a wave of violence that is believed to be linked to gangsterism and lucrative construction tenders, which are in turn connected to politics’, Daily Maverick, p. 1, viewed 05 April 2023, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-04-05-spate-of-shootings-in-cape-town-linked-to-political-gang-and-construction-mafia-elements/.
Durkheim, E., [1897]1952, Suicide: A study in sociology, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London.
Fanon, F., 1963, The wretched of the earth, Grove Press, New York, NY.
Fraser, L., 2023, ‘The biggest types of corruption in South Africa’, BusinessTech, 07 April 2023, viewed 04 December 2023, from https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/678017/the-main-types-of-corruption-in-south-africa/.
Friedman, S., 2010, ‘Government buy the people? Democracy and the private funding of politics in South Africa’, in A. Butler (ed.), Paying for politics: Party funding and political change in South Africa and the global South, Chapter 8, pp. 155–169, Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg.
Fukuyama, F., 2019, IDENTITY: Contemporary identity politics and the struggle for recognition, Profile Books, London.
Ginty, R.M., 2007, ‘Looting in the context of violent conflict: A conceptualisation and typology’, The World Quarterly 25(5), 857–870. https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000231965
Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), 2022, Strategic organized crime risk assessment: South Africa, viewed n.d., from https://globalinitiative.net/wpcontent/uploads/2022/09/GI-TOC-Strategic-Organized-Crime-Risk-Assessment-South-Africa.pdf.
Gumede, V., 2015, ‘Economic policy in post-apartheid South Africa’, in N. De Jager (ed.), South African politics: An introduction, Chapter 10, pp. 226–246, Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
Hsieh, C.C. & Pugh, M.D., 1993, ‘Poverty, income inequality, and violent crime: A meta-analysis of recent aggregate data studies’, Criminal Justice Review 18(2), 182–202. https://doi.org/10.1177/073401689301800203
Kabanyane, T.N., 2006. ‘The manipulation of the poor by the powerful for self-serving careerism – A pastoral care study’, Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria.
King, A., 2015, Who Governs Britains?, Penguin Books, London.
Kotze, J.S., 2015, ‘Political culture in South Africa’, in N. De Jager (ed.), South African politics: An introduction, Chapter 11, pp. 247–272, Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
Madi, P.M., 2016, Black economic empowerment: 20 years later: The baby and the bathwater, KR Publishing, Johannesburg.
Madikizela-Mandela, W., 2013, 491 days: Prisoner number 1323/69, Picador Africa, Johannesburg.
Makgetlaneng, S., 2022, The African renaissance project of Thabo Mbeki: Its South African roots and targets, Institute for Preservation and Development, Pretoria.
Matamba, R., 2023, The business of killing: assassinations in South Africa, p. 15, viewed n.d., from https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Rumbi-Matamba-The-business-of-killing-Assassinations-in-SA.-April23-web.pdf.
Mavuso, S., 2023, Global initiative report says political killings have risen since 2020, KZN is epicentre, IOL, 19 April 2023, viewed 19 November 2023, from https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/global-initiative-report-says-political-killings-have-risen-since-2020-kzn-is-epicentre-23655a4a-663b-421a-a788-df61e5ca389f.
Mbeki, M. & Mbeki, N., 2016, A manifesto for social change: How to save South Africa, Picador, Johannesburg.
Mbeki, T., 1998, The African Renaissance, Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, South African Broadcasting Corporation, Gallagher Estate, Midrand, August 1998 in Thabo Mbeki, Africa – The Time Has Come – Selected Speeches of Thabo Mbeki, p. 297, Mafube Publishing, Johannesburg; Tafelberg Publishers, Cape Town.
McKinley, D.T., 2017, South Africa’s Corporatised liberation: A critical analysis of the ANC in power, Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd., Johannesburg.
Merton, R.K., 1938, ‘Social structure and anomie’, American Sociological Review 3(5), 675–682. https://doi.org/10.2307/2084686
Merton, R.K., 2017, ‘Social structure and anomie’, in Gangs, pp. 3–13, Routledge, viewed 22 August 2023, from http://selfteachingresources.pbworks.com/f/Social+Structure+and+Anomie+-+Merton.pdf.
Moerane, M., 2018, Report of the Moerane commission of enquiry into the underlying causes of the murder of politicians in KwaZulu-Natal, Report, The Kwa Zulu Natal Provincial Government, Durban.
Mpofu-Walsh, S., 2017, Democracy & Delusion: 10 MYTHS in South African Politics, Tafelberg, Cape Town.
Mvenene, M., 2023, ‘Assassinations are a result of economic factors’, The Daily Dispatch, 22 November 2023.
Nomarwayi, T., Breakfast, N.B., Bradshaw, G. & Dlamini, S., 2020, ‘Political killings in the post-apartheid South Africa: A political and criminological perspective in KwaZulu-Natal province, 1994–2019’, Gender & Behaviour 18(1), 15006–15016.
Nyoka, B., 2001, The social and political thought of Archie Mafeje: A Pan-African social scientist ahead of his time, Wits University Press, Johannesburg.
Republic of South Africa, 1996, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, Government Printers, Pretoria.
SABC News, 2023, Unfiltered | Can young leaders take SA forward: Christopher Pappas, 01 December 2023, YouTube video, viewed 26 December 2023, from https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Xo9QEDlvrzE&pp=ygUdVW5maWxoZXJIZCBzYWJjlDEgY2hyaXMgcGFwYXM%3D.
Sebake, B.K. & Mudau, J., 2020, ‘Revisiting whistleblowing amid COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa: An ad nauseam problem’, Journal of Public Administration 55(3–1), 490–501, viewed 10 May 2023, from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joseph-Mudau/publication/351074889.
Shaw, M. & Thomas, K., 2017, ‘The commercialization of assassinations: ‘Hits’ and contract killing in South Africa’, African Affairs 116(465), 597–620
Southall, R., 2004, ‘The ANC and black capitalism in South Africa’, Review of African Political Economy 31(100), 313–328. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305624042000262310
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 2023, viewed 07 December 2023, from https://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/income-comparison-tool/read-more-about-saldru-income-comparison-tool/.
Statistics South Africa, 2023a, GDP weakens in the third quarter, viewed 04 December 2023, from https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16870.
Statistics South Africa, 2023b, Media release: Quarterly labour force survey (QLFS) – Q3:2023, viewed 22 November 2023, from https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q3%202023.pdf.
The World Bank, 2023, The World Bank in South Africa: The World Bank’s strategy in South Africa reflects the country’s development priorities and its unique leadership position at sub-regional and continental levels, viewed 04 December 2023, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview#:~:text=The%20global%20environment%20remained%20supportive,shedding%20and%20transport%20bottlenecks%20intensified.
Transparency International, 2023, Crime Perceptions Index: South Africa, viewed 04 December 2023, from https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/south-africa.
Valodia, I., 2023, South Africa can’t crack the inequality curse. Why, and what can be done?, University of the Witwatersrand, 15 September 2023, viewed 05 December 2023, from https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/opinion/2023/2023-09/south-africa-cant-crack-the-inequality-curse-why-and-what-can-be-done.html#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20most%20recent,value%20between%200%20and%201.
Wallerstein, I., 1988, ‘The bourgeois (ie) as concept and reality’, New Left Review 167(1), 91–106, viewed 04 December 2023, from https://www.iwallerstein.com/wp-content/uploads/docs/NLRBOURG.PDF.
Weber, M., 1948. The theory of social and economic organization, Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
|
Hide
Show all
Email this article (Login required)
