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<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">JOLGRI</journal-id>
<journal-title-group>
<journal-title>Journal of Local Government Research and Innovation</journal-title>
</journal-title-group>
<issn pub-type="ppub">2709-7412</issn>
<issn pub-type="epub">2788-919X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name>AOSIS</publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">JOLGRI-7-320</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.4102/jolgri.v7i0.320</article-id>
<article-categories>
<subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
<subject>Review Article</subject>
</subj-group>
</article-categories>
<title-group>
<article-title>Financial crisis and tax capacity in South Africa&#x2019;s local government: A review of budgetary failures and structural constraints</article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
<contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0009-0001-4043-0019</contrib-id>
<name>
<surname>Langa</surname>
<given-names>Vuyani G.</given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="AF0001">1</xref>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5252-7256</contrib-id>
<name>
<surname>Balkaran</surname>
<given-names>Sanjay</given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="AF0001">1</xref>
</contrib>
<aff id="AF0001"><label>1</label>Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Management and Public Administration Sciences, Walter Sisulu University, Butterworth, South Africa</aff>
</contrib-group>
<author-notes>
<corresp id="cor1"><bold>Corresponding author:</bold> Vuyani Langa, <email xlink:href="vlanga@wsu.ac.za">vlanga@wsu.ac.za</email></corresp>
</author-notes>
<pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>16</day><month>02</month><year>2026</year></pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date>
<volume>7</volume>
<elocation-id>320</elocation-id>
<history>
<date date-type="received"><day>15</day><month>09</month><year>2025</year></date>
<date date-type="accepted"><day>15</day><month>12</month><year>2025</year></date>
</history>
<permissions>
<copyright-statement>&#x00A9; 2026. The Authors</copyright-statement>
<copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
<license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">
<license-p>Licensee: AOSIS. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license.</license-p>
</license>
</permissions>
<abstract>
<sec id="st1">
<title>Background</title>
<p>South African municipalities have been experiencing increased fiscal distress for over the past two decades, with some approaching collapse. Weak budgeting, growing debt, poor revenue collection and underspending on service delivery reduce financial sustainability. Structural inequalities, political interference and weak governance worsen these challenges.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="st2">
<title>Aim</title>
<p>This article critically reviews financial crisis factors, with a focus on tax capacity, revenue generation and fiscal management.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="st3">
<title>Method</title>
<p>A systematic literature review of peer-reviewed studies, government reports and grey literature (2000&#x2013;2025) was conducted. Thematic coding showed recurring patterns, theoretical perspectives and findings related to budgetary performance, fiscal relations and administrative capacity.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="st4">
<title>Results</title>
<p>The review highlights how administrative inefficiencies, poor oversight and misaligned political incentives drive municipal crises. Despite revenue potential in some municipalities, weak enforcement, corruption and poor asset management limit performance. Capacity gaps in financial planning and auditing deepen instability. Although essential, transfers and the equitable share formula often fail to address inequalities and institutional variation.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="st5">
<title>Conclusion</title>
<p>Addressing municipal crises requires structural reform, capacity building, accountability and stronger fiscal decentralisation.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="st6">
<title>Contribution</title>
<p>This study advances debates on municipal finance by providing an integrated, literature-based analysis to guide future research and policy.</p>
</sec>
</abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd>municipal finance</kwd>
<kwd>tax capacity</kwd>
<kwd>fiscal crisis</kwd>
<kwd>South Africa</kwd>
<kwd>local government</kwd>
<kwd>budgeting</kwd>
<kwd>decentralisation</kwd>
<kwd>revenue generation</kwd>
</kwd-group>
<funding-group>
<funding-statement><bold>Funding information</bold> This research project did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. The study was conducted on a nonprofit basis without external financial support.</funding-statement>
</funding-group>
</article-meta>
</front>
<body>
<sec id="s0001">
<title>Introduction</title>
<p>Municipal finance is the cornerstone of democratic decentralisation and developmental governance in South Africa. As the sphere of government closest to the people, municipalities are constitutionally mandated to provide basic services, foster socio-economic development and promote participatory governance (Republic of South Africa <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0027">1996</xref>). However, this ideal role is fundamentally weakened when municipalities face fiscal disrepair. In the South African context, the municipal financial crisis is not only episodic or peripheral but also systemic, deep-rooted and accelerating. Financially distressed municipalities now constitute the majority rather than the minority: according to the 2023 Auditor-General report, more than 80 municipalities are experiencing financial crisis, with 43 municipalities being described as &#x2018;dysfunctional&#x2019; and only 16 as financially stable (Auditor-General South Africa [AGSA] <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>). This alarming pattern not only corrodes service delivery and public trust but also threatens the viability of local government as an institution. This level of crisis persists despite a relatively robust intergovernmental fiscal framework, which includes mechanisms such as the equitable share and conditional grants. This disconnect raises a critical question: why do so many municipalities fail to achieve even the most basic financial sustainability despite having constitutional and policy support? This review suggests that the issue arises from a complex mix of institutional incapacity, political interference, structural inequality and chronic failures in local fiscal governance. Clearly defining the key concepts is essential to framing this argument. Tax capacity refers to a municipality&#x2019;s theoretical and practical ability to raise revenue through various instruments, most commonly property rates, service charges, business licences and user fees. It is not only a function of economic base but also of institutional capability, enforcement efficiency and administrative will (Bahl &#x0026; Bird <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0002">2008</xref>). This capacity remains underutilised in South Africa, particularly in rural and smaller municipalities with weak administrative systems and low ratepayer compliance (Fjeldstad, Katera &#x0026; Ngalewa <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0009">2020</xref>). Budgetary failure, by contrast, denotes the persistent inability of a municipality to formulate, adopt or execute budgets aligned with its strategic priorities, integrated development plans (IDPs), and the principles of the <italic>Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA)</italic>. This failure is not only technical but also profoundly political, as budgeting often becomes a terrain of contestation and patronage rather than rational resource allocation (De Visser &#x0026; Steytler <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0005">2016</xref>). Finally, fiscal mismanagement covers a broader spectrum of financial maladministration, ranging from irregular, fruitless and unauthorised expenditure to failing to comply with basic accounting standards and supply chain regulations (AGSA <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>), showing systemic collapse of public financial controls at the local level.</p>
<p>This literature review is both a scholarly and normative intervention. Its purpose is not simply to recount what is already known but to critically interrogate the dominant narratives and assumptions underpinning existing analyses of municipal financial crises in South Africa. Whilst previous studies have attributed fiscal distress to capacity constraints or political instability (Kanyane <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0011">2011</xref>; Mokgopo <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0021">2021</xref>), this review argues that analysis must move beyond superficial diagnoses and engage rigorously with the structural and institutional architectures of local finance. We argue that prevailing financial dysfunction is embedded in a governance system that tolerates noncompliance, rewards political loyalty over competence and perpetuates intergovernmental ambiguities. By synthesising empirical studies, audit outcomes and policy analyses, this review identifies the key patterns of dysfunction, traces their roots and calls for a necessary reconfiguration of local government finance. This endeavour is urgent. As South Africa teeters on the edge of a municipal collapse pandemic, the discourse must shift from rhetorical lamentation to structural interrogation.</p>
<p>The academic community plays a critical role not only as observers but also as architects of alternative futures grounded in evidence and integrity. We reject fatalism that portrays municipalities as irredeemably broken. Instead, this study asserts that a targeted, evidence-based reform is possible and imperative. This requires rejecting technocratic fixes in isolation from political realities and recommitting to institutional capacity, accountability and a social contract between municipalities and their constituents. In advancing this agenda, this literature review contributes to offering a systematic and critical synthesis of current research on municipal financial crises and tax capacity, highlighting the interconnected nature of revenue generation, expenditure discipline and institutional accountability, whilst guiding future research, policy and reform. The findings presented here are a clarion call to reclaim the promise of local governments as a site of transformation, inclusion and sustainable development.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s0002">
<title>Research methods and design</title>
<p>This study employs a systematic review methodology, incorporating rigorous and critical analysis to explore the crisis of municipal finance and the limitations of tax capacity within the South African local government. The review moves beyond descriptive accounts and examines the underlying structures, assumptions and discourses shaping fiscal dysfunction at the municipal level. Anchored in qualitative interpretivism, the review maps and synthesises empirical, theoretical and policy literature to underline analytical depth and scholarly reflexivity. A set of interrelated inquiries guide the research: What are the prevailing explanations for the municipal financial crisis in South Africa? How is tax capacity understood and constrained within the literature and policy discourse? In what ways do institutional and structural factors exacerbate budgetary and fiscal failures? Moreover, how might a critical synthesis of existing knowledge inform viable reform pathways?</p>
<p>The review draws on interdisciplinary sources, including peer-reviewed literature from <italic>Local Government Studies, Development Southern Africa, Public Administration, African Journal of Public Affairs</italic> and the <italic>Journal of Local Government Research and Innovation</italic>. Government reports issued by the AGSA, the National Treasury, CoGTA and SALGA were integrated, alongside grey literature from the HSRC, PARI and the FFC.</p>
<p>The inclusion criteria required that sources be published between 2000 and 2025 and explicitly address South African municipal finance, tax performance, intergovernmental fiscal relations or institutional governance. Emphasis was placed on post-2004 materials, which were aligned with the implementation of the MFMA. Studies focusing exclusively on national or provincial fiscal systems or lacking direct relevance to local government were excluded. From an initial sample of 94 sources, 47 were retained following a two-stage screening. Firstly, thematic relevance was assessed using predefined categories (budgeting and planning failures; revenue and tax capacity; institutional governance; intergovernmental fiscal relations). Sources that did not substantively speak to at least one category were removed. Secondly, methodological rigour was assessed by evaluating the clarity of the research design, the credibility of the data and the strength of analytical reasoning. Materials failing either standard were excluded, ensuring transparency and mitigating selection bias.</p>
<p>The search strategy involved using Google Scholar, Scopus, Sabinet, JSTOR, EBSCOhost and AOSIS platforms and searching for terms such as &#x2018;municipal financial crisis South Africa&#x2019;, &#x2018;tax capacity local government&#x2019;, &#x2018;MFMA compliance&#x2019; and &#x2018;audit outcomes municipalities&#x2019;. Boolean operators and filters enhanced precision and ensured comprehensive coverage. A dual methodological lens was applied: thematic coding and critical discourse analysis (CDA). Thematic coding organised the literature into the areas noted above, facilitated through qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) to ensure consistency and traceability in theme generation.</p>
<p>To substantiate the use of CDA, specific textual features were analysed across policy documents, audit reports and academic texts. This included examining recurring lexical choices such as &#x2018;mismanagement&#x2019;, &#x2018;noncompliance&#x2019; or &#x2018;capacity failure&#x2019;, identifying discursive frames that normalise technical explanations over structural or political critiques; and analysing how institutional actors such as National Treasury or AGSA construct narratives of blame, accountability or reform. Drawing on Fairclough (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0007">2013</xref>), the review interrogated how these discursive patterns shape understandings of municipal dysfunction and implicitly prioritise certain policy responses. Critical discourse analysis functioned not only as a theoretical reference but also as an operational analysis tool.</p>
<p>Analytical integrity was strengthened through triangulation across academic, policy and audit-based sources. Reflexivity was maintained through continuous reflection on interpretive biases and the contested nature of local government discourse. Document authenticity was safeguarded by including only peer-reviewed, formally published or government-verified materials.</p>
<p>Whilst comprehensive, this systematic review inherently carries limitations, providing an incomplete picture, as it reflects only available research and may not capture emerging contextual shifts, including variations in South Africa&#x2019;s responses to different crises. Additionally, tax capacity is dynamic and reflects both revenue mobilisation imperatives and broader socio-economic priorities, meaning that strategic trade-offs in tax policy may not be fully captured in secondary sources. Nevertheless, these limitations do not diminish the review&#x2019;s analytical value; instead, they highlight key knowledge gaps and accentuate the need for further empirical inquiry and institutional transparency objectives to which this review contributes. The inclusion of a Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) flow diagram enhances the transparency and reproducibility of the systematic review process, providing a clear visual summary of the identification, screening, eligibility and inclusion of studies (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="F0001">Figure 1</xref>).</p>
<fig id="F0001">
<label>FIGURE 1</label>
<caption><p>Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) flow diagram.</p></caption>
<graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="JOLGRI-7-320-g001.tif"/>
</fig>
<sec id="s20003">
<title>Thematic literature review</title>
<p>The literature on municipal finance in South Africa uncovers a profound and urgent issue that is neither episodic nor accidental. Instead, it reflects a systemic governance decay rooted in local government&#x2019;s political, administrative and fiscal architectures, an interpretation consistent with theories of fiscal federalism and state capacity. Persistent budgetary distress experienced by over 80 municipalities (AGSA <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>) shows a structural, rather than temporary, failure. This review critically synthesises scholarly and policy research under four interconnected themes: budgetary failure and planning dysfunction, revenue generation and tax capacity, institutional mismanagement and corruption, and intergovernmental fiscal asymmetries and governance failure. Although presented thematically, this synthesis is grounded in broader theoretical debates on state capability, intergovernmental fiscal relations and the political economy of public finance.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s20004">
<title>Budgetary failure and planning dysfunction</title>
<p>Across the academic literature, South African municipalities consistently fail to develop and implement credible, developmentally aligned and strategically sound budgets. Whilst often treated as a technical instrument, budgeting is also a political and institutional act shaped by the incentives and constraints described in fiscal federalism theory. Auditor-General South Africa (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>) persistently flags municipalities for unrealistic revenue assumptions, weak capital expenditure performance and misalignment between budgets, IDPs and SDBIPs. Reddy (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0026">2016</xref>) and Dube and Ledwaba (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0006">2023</xref>) illustrate how political elites control planning processes for patronage, whilst Mahlatsi and Sebola (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0015">2023</xref>) highlight skills deficits and politicised appointments as persistent barriers to credible planning. These patterns reflect long-standing institutional weaknesses historically rooted in apartheid-era spatial and administrative fragmentation, with post-1994 reforms only partially addressing the resulting capacity gaps. Chipkin and Meny-Gibert (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0003">2013</xref>) and Mofokeng and Tshishonga (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0020">2024</xref>) demonstrate how cadre deployment undermines oversight, whilst the National Treasury (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0023">2024</xref>) notes that deviations from planned budgets show political capture rather than mere administrative error. In smaller municipalities, compliance obligations often overshadow strategic planning (Khoza &#x0026; Nzimande <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0013">2023</xref>). The literature, therefore, stresses that budgeting dysfunction is not only deterministic but also emerges from a mix of historical legacies, weak institutions and political incentives.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s20005">
<title>Tax capacity and revenue generation constraints</title>
<p>A second major theme concerns the persistent gap between municipal tax capacity and actual tax effort. The distinction drawn by Bahl and Bird (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0002">2008</xref>) remains central to the analysis. Fjeldstad et al. (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0009">2020</xref>) and Matsiliza (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0018">2024</xref>) identify operational constraints, including outdated billing systems, incomplete valuation rolls and unreliable customer databases. Auditor-General South Africa (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>) confirms that more than 60&#x0025; of municipalities lack accurate revenue information, hindering tax efforts. However, the literature also cautions against a one-dimensional narrative: South Africa has shown pockets of resilience, where municipalities have improved their collection systems or effectively enforced credit control. Political dynamics remain a key constraint, with the FFC (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0008">2020</xref>) and Ngubane and Tshoose (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0025">2023</xref>) noting that councillors&#x2019; reluctance to enforce debt recovery is heightened during election cycles. Structural inequalities and spatial legacies, particularly in poorer and rural municipalities, further weaken tax capacity (Jili &#x0026; Mashile <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0010">2024</xref>). Zulu and Sibanda (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0029">2023</xref>) describe a downward spiral between poor service delivery and declining payment compliance. Overall, tax capacity challenges reflect a historically ingrained, inequitable revenue base, which is compounded by institutional weaknesses and political disincentives.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s20006">
<title>Institutional mismanagement and corruption</title>
<p>A dominant theme in the literature erodes institutional integrity within the local government. Auditor-General South Africa (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>) reports irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure of over R20.29 billion in the 2021&#x2013;2022 period, signalling systemic institutional failure rather than episodic mismanagement. Moeti and Tshabalala (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0019">2023</xref>) and Van der Waldt (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0028">2018</xref>) highlight the ineffectiveness of municipal public accounts committees (MPACs) and internal audit units, often compromised by political interference. Mokgopo (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0021">2021</xref>) locates this within broader patterns of cadre deployment, undermining state capacity by weakening meritocratic recruitment. De Visser (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0004">2021</xref>) argues that legislative frameworks such as the MFMA are not inherently flawed but are unevenly enforced due to institutional fragmentation inherited from apartheid&#x2019;s administrative geography. Kekana and Biyela (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0012">2023</xref>) further describe dual governance systems wherein informal patronage networks override formal rules. In comparison, some municipalities under administration (Section 139) show improvement. Marivate and Machete (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0017">2023</xref>) caution that recovery is uneven and rarely addresses structural corruption. These institutional weaknesses reflect historical deficits in state capacity, contemporary political incentives and uneven oversight, rather than a simplistic, deterministic decline.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s20007">
<title>Intergovernmental fiscal asymmetries and governance failure</title>
<p>The fourth theme concerns deep structural asymmetries within South Africa&#x2019;s intergovernmental fiscal system. Although the Constitution envisions cooperative governance, the practical implementation of fiscal decentralisation has been uneven and does not align with the principles of fiscal federalism. Malan and Mokoena (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0016">2023</xref>) suggest that the equitable share formula, although progressive, does not account for variations in institutional capacity or governance performance, resulting in perverse incentives. Naidu and Daniels (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0022">2023</xref>) highlight unfunded mandates that push municipalities towards insolvency, whilst Madumo (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0014">2015</xref>) and Netshitomboni and Naidoo (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0024">2024</xref>) show that interventions under Section 139 are inconsistently applied and vulnerable to political influence. Historical inequities &#x2013; such as the apartheid legacy of spatial unevenness and underdeveloped local administrations &#x2013; continue to shape fiscal capacity and institutional performance. Whilst Kgomo and Sithole (2025) propose performance-based transfers and improved oversight, the literature suggests that reforms must be grounded in stronger state institutions insulated from political interference. Collectively, the literature affirms that the municipal financial crisis is embedded in a complex matrix of historical structural inequalities, institutional fragility, political incentives and uneven intergovernmental coordination &#x2013; rather than a deterministic or singular causal pathway.</p>
</sec>
</sec>
<sec id="s0008">
<title>Results</title>
<p>The thematic literature review demonstrates a deeply entrenched crisis in South African municipal finance that is systemic and structurally embedded. This discussion consolidates the four analytical themes: budgetary dysfunction, tax capacity constraints, institutional mismanagement and intergovernmental fiscal asymmetries. These themes form a unified framework that interrogates the municipal fiscal collapse&#x2019;s nature, causes and implications. In doing so, it exposes the interconnectedness between financial failure and the broader pathologies of local governance, affirming that this crisis cannot be understood or resolved in isolation from its political economy. At the heart of the crisis lies the politicisation of budgeting and resource allocation. As the literature review demonstrated, the budget, a central tool for policy implementation and service delivery, was systematically subverted by factional interests and elite manipulation. This discussion intensifies that critique. Rather than serving the rational, developmental functions prescribed in policy frameworks, budgets in many municipalities have been hollowed out and redirected towards patronage networks (Chipkin &#x0026; Meny-Gibert <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0003">2013</xref>; Reddy <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0026">2016</xref>). Integrated Development Plans, far from being strategic blueprints, are routinely ignored or retrofitted post hoc to justify politically motivated spending. The National Treasury&#x2019;s repeated concern about persistent budget deviations (National Treasury <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0023">2024</xref>) further validates this argument. Budgeting in its current form has become an instrument of elite consolidation, rather than a mechanism for democratic development.</p>
<p>The concept of tax capacity is also severely compromised. As the review established, municipalities theoretically enjoy constitutionally protected fiscal autonomy, empowered to raise revenues through property taxes, service charges and user fees. However, these powers are grossly underutilised. This discussion extends that critique by showing that revenue shortfalls not only arise from outdated billing systems and fragmented data (AGSA <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>; Fjeldstad et al. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0009">2020</xref>) but also stem from deliberate refusal to enforce collection in politically sensitive constituencies. Councillors rely on local patronage structures for electoral survival and show reluctance to implement unpopular credit control measures (Ngubane &#x0026; Tshoose <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0025">2023</xref>). In doing so, they perpetuate a governance culture in which fiscal accountability is sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. This transforms what should be an administrative task, collecting legally owed revenue, into a political risk. Moreover, this failure to raise revenue locally further entrenches municipalities&#x2019; dependence on intergovernmental transfers, which are structurally flawed. Whilst the equitable share formula promotes horizontal equity, it remains insensitive to performance differentials (Financial and Fiscal Commission [FFC] <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0008">2020</xref>). Consequently, well-managed municipalities receive the same or even less, than mismanaged ones. This effectively rewards dysfunction and disincentivises reform. The literature repeatedly critiques the lack of performance-based transfers (Malan &#x0026; Mokoena <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0016">2023</xref>). However, this discussion reveals how the absence of conditionalities entrenches vertical fiscal moral hazard: municipalities are assured of financial support regardless of budgetary discipline and thus have no incentive to improve. Compounding this are the structural failures in provincial oversight. Section 139 interventions, which are constitutionally mandated to correct municipal failure, are selectively and politically applied (Madumo <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0014">2015</xref>; Netshitomboni &#x0026; Naidoo <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0024">2024</xref>). The inability of provinces to decisively act in collapsing municipalities exhibits administrative incapacity and a broader governance failure, as oversight mechanisms lack both political neutrality and institutional robustness. When provincial governments hesitate to intervene in dysfunctional municipalities due to party-political alignments, the principle of cooperative governance is fundamentally undermined.</p>
<p>These political and fiscal dynamics are compounded by institutional corruption and managerial decay, which have become normalised features of local governance. The AGSA (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0001">2023</xref>) shows that fruitless, wasteful and irregular expenditure is not an exception but the rule. The literature identifies compromised oversight structures (Van der Waldt <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0028">2018</xref>), cadre deployment (Mokgopo <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0021">2021</xref>), and compromised internal audit systems (Moeti &#x0026; Tshabalala <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0019">2023</xref>) as key drivers of institutional rot. This discussion highlights that these are core features of a political-administrative system prioritising loyalty over capability. Even well-crafted legislation, such as the MFMA, is rendered ineffective without a political will to enforce its provisions (De Visser <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0004">2021</xref>). The act exists more as a symbol of reform than as a functional constraint on misgovernance.</p>
<p>The decentralisation model underpinning the local government system is also called into question. Whilst decentralisation normatively associates with participatory, responsive and locally attuned governance, the literature and this discussion demonstrate that it has produced an overburdened and under-resourced local sphere in the South African context. Responsibilities have been devolved without the requisite capacity, authority or support. Municipalities are tasked with delivering infrastructure, planning spatial development and driving local economic development all within a structural context of resource scarcity, political manipulation and weak accountability mechanisms (Kgomo &#x0026; Sithole 2025; Naidu &#x0026; Daniels <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="CIT0022">2023</xref>). This contradiction is a policy gap and a design flaw in the post-apartheid governance model. A dominant theme in both the literature and this discussion is the misdiagnosis of the crisis. Capacity-building is often offered as the panacea, with the assumption that technical skills shortages are the root cause. However, this assumption is increasingly untenable. As this article has demonstrated, the real obstacle is the presence of entrenched political incentives favouring loyalty over performance and opacity over transparency, rather than the absence of skills. The failure to comply with audit guidelines or procurement norms cannot be reduced to ignorance, indicating a rational choice by actors operating in a governance system that lacks meaningful accountability. Thus, the crisis is not technical but political, not incidental but systemic.</p>
<p>Drawing on these themes together, the discussion suggests a sobering conclusion: South Africa&#x2019;s municipal financial crisis is a structural, political and institutional phenomenon. Addressing it requires more than reformist tinkering or managerial improvements. Addressing this requires a fundamental rethinking of the governance architecture, including the nature of local political power, the structure of fiscal federalism and the integrity of public institutions. Unless these foundations are addressed, efforts at reform, however well-intentioned, will remain superficial and ineffective. What emerges is not simply an account of dysfunction but a call to reframe the conversation around the local government. Rather than being treated as passive agents in need of support, municipalities must be treated as contested spaces where power, politics and accountability intersect. The state must confront the uncomfortable reality that only managing dysfunction is insufficient. Disrupting it intellectually, institutionally and politically is a challenge. If this disruption does not occur, the consequences will be severe: continued spatial inequality, deepening service delivery protests, eroding public trust and a fractured social contract. This discussion, consistent with the thematic literature review, asserts unequivocally that the failure of South African municipalities is not a matter of knowledge or compliance, but of political and institutional design. Recognising this is the first step towards rebuilding a developmental local government system capable of restoring democratic legitimacy and delivering equitable development.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s0009">
<title>Recommendations</title>
<p>Reforming South Africa&#x2019;s local government finance requires a multifaceted and courageous approach addressing both structural weaknesses and governance failures. The following recommendations outline a coherent strategy to restore fiscal integrity, enhance accountability and rebuild public trust in municipal institutions. It is imperative to depoliticise financial management through independent appointments, which restores credibility and effectiveness in South Africa&#x2019;s local government finance. A crucial starting point is the creation of an independent Municipal Finance Competency Commission tasked with vetting and appointing Chief Financial Officers and Municipal Managers based solely on merit. This would ensure that competence, not political allegiance, drives leadership selection. Building on this, the system of intergovernmental transfers must be reconfigured to promote accountability. By linking the equitable share formula to governance performance, municipalities that consistently mismanage funds or deliver poor audit outcomes could face conditionalities on funding. At the same time, those demonstrating excellence are rewarded with incentive grants and infrastructure support. This recalibration would serve as a corrective mechanism, promoting responsible fiscal leadership. Simultaneously, municipal revenue systems need to be strengthened by combining digital innovation and legal reform. Implementing automated valuation systems, real-time billing, geospatial tax mapping and transparent payment portals can significantly improve efficiency. However, these upgrades must be underpinned by robust legal instruments that empower municipalities to enforce compliance and shield revenue from political interference, narrowing the gap between potential and actual revenue. As part of broader fiscal oversight, there is a pressing need to establish a National Municipal Recovery Tribunal. This centralised, multidisciplinary body comprising experts from Treasury, the Auditor-General, legal sectors and civil society should be empowered to investigate and remediate municipal financial collapse, recommending interventions such as Section 139 takeovers, forensic audits and asset recovery to address systemic failures and end the culture of impunity.</p>
<p>In parallel, local civic participation in budgetary processes must be strengthened to ensure long-term reform. Restructuring IDP and municipal budgeting to allow for inclusive public oversight, especially through platforms like digital town halls, ward-based fiscal monitors and participatory civic forums, can transform citizens from passive observers into active custodians of accountability. Finally, the <italic>MFMA</italic> must be amended to embed anticorruption mechanisms. Mandatory corruption risk assessments, procurement audits and protections for whistleblowers must become standard practice within every municipality, ensuring that compliance mechanisms are not symbolic but function as active deterrents against abuse. These interconnected recommendations offer more than technical fixes; they form a comprehensive blueprint for municipal recovery. South Africa now stands at a critical juncture. It can confront municipal fiscal dysfunction head-on with transformative, systemic reforms or allow the continued subsidisation of institutional decay. The tools are available; the political will to act decisively and realise local government&#x2019;s constitutional promise as a truly accountable, participatory and developmental sphere of governance remains. Whilst these recommendations provide a comprehensive roadmap for reform, it is important to acknowledge the study&#x2019;s limitations. The complexity of South Africa&#x2019;s local government finance system indicates contextual variations across municipalities, which may affect the applicability of certain measures. Additionally, evolving political dynamics and unforeseen economic factors could influence the implementation and outcomes of the proposed reforms. Further empirical research and pilot initiatives will be essential to refine and adapt these strategies in practice.</p>
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<sec id="s0010">
<title>Conclusion</title>
<p>This article set out to critically interrogate the municipal financial crisis in South Africa by examining the interlinked failures of budgetary planning, tax capacity and institutional governance. Drawing on a wide-ranging literature review framed by interpretive inquiry, this study advances the argument that these fiscal dysfunctions are not isolated or technical but structurally embedded within South Africa&#x2019;s local governance regime. The original objective to synthesise existing academic, policy and audit-based knowledge into a cohesive understanding of the crisis has been met by revealing the converging factors that enable financial collapse and inhibit reform. The themes established in the introduction, budgetary failure, constrained tax capacity and fiscal mismanagement demonstrate how politicised decision-making, institutional corruption and a flawed intergovernmental fiscal framework collectively undermine local government. The evidence suggests a disabling environment where local governments are tasked with extensive responsibilities but are denied the fiscal autonomy, administrative capacity or political insulation necessary for effective governance. Budgeting, far from being a rational process, is often distorted by factional imperatives. Tax enforcement is politically discouraged, particularly in municipalities plagued by patronage. The oversight regime, dominated by compliance-driven auditing, has failed to restore accountability without effective sanctions and a strong political will. This study contributes to local governance by reframing municipal fiscal dysfunction as a structural and political issue, rather than simply a technical shortcoming, providing a critical framework for understanding why many well-intentioned reforms have failed and why new approaches must interrogate the political economy of local institutions. Future research must move beyond performance metrics and investigate the relational dynamics between political leadership, fiscal flows and institutional decay. It is vital to have a deeper understanding of how political incentives intersect with fiscal policy at the local level. Ultimately, if developmental local government is to be reclaimed, the reform of municipal finance must begin with reforming political governance itself.</p>
<p>This article presents a critical, interdisciplinary synthesis of South Africa&#x2019;s municipal fiscal crisis, reframing it as a deeply political and structural issue, rather than a purely technical or administrative one. Through its thematic integration of budgetary failure, tax capacity erosion, fiscal mismanagement and dysfunctional intergovernmental relations, the study offers a comprehensive and conceptually cohesive understanding of why municipal collapse persists despite repeated interventions. Its most significant contribution to the existing body of knowledge lies in shifting the analytical focus from narrow performance metrics and compliance frameworks to the broader political economy of municipal governance. It challenges the dominant narratives that highlight capacity-building and technical training, demonstrating that these approaches often fail because they do not contend with entrenched patronage systems, politicised budgeting and the lack of meaningful consequence management. The article fills a critical gap in the literature by theorising the structural dysfunctions within fiscal decentralisation and governance alignment in the South African context.</p>
<p>For future research, this article opens new avenues of inquiry into the relational dynamics between political actors, fiscal regimes and institutional behaviour at the local level. Comparative studies across high- and low-performing municipalities provide further empirical validation of the political factors driving fiscal collapse. The proposed integrative framework also invites scholarly exploration into how power configurations influence revenue enforcement, budgeting priorities and local development outcomes. Regarding policy implications, the study advocates for a decisive shift towards the transfer of performance-based intergovernments, the depoliticisation of financial management and the institutionalisation of independent oversight mechanisms. Policymakers are urged to consider decentralisation as a legal framework and a lived system of governance that must be made resilient against elite capture. In providing scholars, policymakers and civil society with an actionable framework for understanding and responding to municipal fiscal crises, this article lays the foundation for more honest, evidence-based and transformative local government reform that could inspire institutional recovery and democratic renewal. South Africa&#x2019;s municipal fiscal crisis is both a policy failure and a crisis of political will. To reverse the alarming trajectory of dysfunction, collapse and public disillusionment, this article proposes bold, systemic and actionable recommendations grounded in the core findings of the reviewed literature. These interventions are not incremental tweaks but transformative imperatives to restore integrity, efficiency and developmental purpose to local government.</p>
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<title>Acknowledgements</title>
<sec id="s20011" sec-type="COI-statement">
<title>Competing interests</title>
<p>The authors declare that they have no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.</p>
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<sec id="s20012">
<title>CRediT authorship contribution</title>
<p>Vuyani G. Langa: Conceptualisation, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing &#x2013; original draft, visualisation, Data curation, Resources, Writing &#x2013; review &#x0026; editing. Sanjay Balkaran: Methodology, Formal analysis, Visualisation, Writing &#x2013; review &#x0026; editing, Supervision. All authors reviewed the article, contributed to the discussion of results, approved the final version for submission and publication and took responsibility for the integrity of its findings.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s20013">
<title>Ethical considerations</title>
<p>This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s20014" sec-type="data-availability">
<title>Data availability</title>
<p>Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed in this study.</p>
</sec>
<sec id="s20015">
<title>Disclaimer</title>
<p>The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and are the product of professional research. These do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency or that of the publisher. The authors are responsible for this article&#x2019;s results, findings and content.</p>
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<fn><p><bold>How to cite this article:</bold> Langa, V.G. &#x0026; Balkaran S., 2026, &#x2018;Financial crisis and tax capacity in South Africa&#x2019;s local government: A review of budgetary failures and structural constraints&#x2019;, <italic>Journal of Local Government Research and Innovation</italic> 7(0), a320. <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.4102/jolgri.v7i0.320">https://doi.org/10.4102/jolgri.v7i0.320</ext-link></p></fn>
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