Abstract
Background: Coalition governments involve multiple political parties uniting to govern because of the absence of a majority party in the council following electoral outcomes. In South Africa, coalitions have become much more common since the 2016 and 2021 local government elections.
Aim: This study investigates the implications of unstable coalition governments on municipal administration within the Gauteng metropolitan municipalities.
Setting: The study focused on the City of Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, and the City of Johannesburg metropolitan municipalities in the Gauteng Province of South Africa.
Methods: Employing a qualitative approach with a case study design, this research draws upon secondary sources and employs thematic analysis for a comprehensive examination of data.
Results: The findings underscore that unstable coalition governments exert multifaceted effects on municipal administration in Gauteng. Firstly, they erode the foundational principles of democratic and accountable governance. Secondly, the instability adversely affects the provision of essential services. Thirdly, the process of budget formulation and approval is compromised. Fourthly, the precarious nature of political coalitions jeopardises creating a safe and healthy municipal environment and contributes to hung councils. Fifthly, municipal human resource practices are negatively influenced, alongside challenges in effectively managing municipal funds.
Conclusion: There is a critical need for government and municipalities to institute effective legislation and policies addressing the challenges associated with unstable coalition governments in order to foster stability, promoting democratic values and ensuring efficient municipal administration within the Gauteng metropolitan context.
Contribution: The study makes key recommendations for improving municipal administration under coalition councils in South Africa’s metros.
Keywords: administration; coalitions; Gauteng; municipalities; South Africa.
Introduction
Despite the perception that coalition governments are rare in Africa, they are not uncommon, and South Africa is no exception to this trend (Ariotti & Golder 2017). Coalition governance in South Africa has gained significance, particularly following the decline in support for the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, which opened the possibility of coalitions in municipal governments (Labuschagne 2018). A shift that presented an opportunity for nation building and social cohesion, aiming to move away from the apartheid legacy of racial and social division (Makole, Ntshangase & Adewumi 2022). Since the 2016 and 2021 local government elections, an increasing number of councils have fallen under coalitions. However, coalitions in South Africa have been characterised by instability. The reality is that the coalition governments have brought about more service delivery challenges than anticipated (Masiya 2022). Consequently, unstable coalition governments have become topical in contemporary South African research on municipal administration.
Madisa (2023) points out that coalitions in Gauteng have been in disarray following the 2016 and 2021 municipal elections, with the three metros, namely, the City of Tshwane, the City of Johannesburg and the City of Ekurhuleni, clandestinely changing mayors and executive committees. This constant change has affected municipal programmes, causing delays in passing budgets and general service delivery provisions. This is supported by Mantzaris (2022), who argues that coalition governments in metropolitan municipalities have experienced significant problems in their interactions with administrators at different political and bureaucratic levels.
Conti and Marangoni (2015) observe that in the post-Second World War Western Europe, all major countries have been governed at some point by coalitions except Spain. Coalition governments in Europe have garnered increased attention because of the rise of populism and Euroscepticism, leading to unique political dynamics. This is also confirmed by Bergman, Bäck and Hellström (2021) who state that coalitions constitute almost 70% of the cabinets in Western Europe, and that the Scandinavian countries have been dominated by minority cabinets.
The formation of coalition governments between parties of different ideological backgrounds, including populist parties, has indeed become more common (Fernández-García 2021).
Thus, extant research on coalition governments primarily focuses on assessing the complexities of national political coalitions, particularly in the European context (Christiansen & Pedersen 2012). Additionally, research on coalition governments at the national level has highlighted the complexities involved in coalition formation, portfolio allocation and governance dynamics. These studies have shown that coalition governments are often minimal winning coalitions, emphasising the need for cooperation and compromise among parties to maintain stability and effectiveness (Gross 2021). Additionally, the literature underscores the significance of understanding coalition governance in different political contexts, including parliamentary and presidential systems, to grasp the nuances of coalition politics (Labuschagne 2018). While coalition governments have been extensively studied in political science literature, there remains a notable gap in our understanding of their implications on municipal administration, particularly in the context of South Africa. Recognising this lacuna, our study seeks to address this by focusing on the ramifications of unstable coalition governments on municipal administration within Gauteng’s metropolitan municipalities.
We adopt the definition of coalition governments, as defined by Gross and Krauss (2019), who define coalition governments as political entities where multiple political parties come together to form a government at various levels, including national, regional and local levels. These coalitions are formed based on agreements that outline the distribution of power and responsibilities among the participating parties. Martin and Stevenson (2001) highlight that coalition governments are typically formed to secure a majority in the legislature, ensuring that individual members of the coalition receive maximum benefits.
To address the knowledge gap, the study adopts the Institutional Theory. Institutional Theory focuses on the influence of formal and informal rules, norms and practices on organisational behaviour and outcomes (Lammers & Garcia 2017). It examines how institutions shape the actions and decisions of individuals and organisations, including governments and public administrations.
This study bridges a critical gap in interdisciplinary scholarship, particularly within the realms of public administration and political science, by examining the dynamics of unstable coalitions in South African municipalities. By unravelling the intricate interplay between politics and administration, our research sheds light on how these domains mutually influence one another, specifically in the context of municipal service delivery.
Additionally, by exploring the politics-administrative dichotomy within the context of unstable coalitions, our research not only advances theoretical debates but also offers practical implications for governance and policy-making. Through empirical analysis and case studies, we aim to elucidate how political instability impacts administrative processes and service delivery outcomes, thus informing strategies for effective governance in the face of coalition dynamics.
Overall, our study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the complexities inherent in managing municipal affairs within the context of unstable coalitions, offering valuable insights for scholars, practitioners and policymakers grappling with governance challenges in South Africa and beyond.
This introduction and background are followed by the theoretical framework, literature review, methodology, findings, discussion and conclusion.
Theoretical framework
The study utilised the Institutional Theory. In using this theory to analyse unstable coalitions, ‘the idea is to analyze how equilibria that are self-enforcing (in terms of mutual expectations about others’ behaviors) can collapse and so induce switching to another equilibrium’ (Brousseau, Garrouste & Raynaud 2011:3).
Alam et al. (2021) and Bag et al. (2023) further posit that Institutional Theory is grounded in a number of assumptions that include isomorphism, normative, regulative, legitimacy and resource dependency. For the purpose of this study, focus will be placed on isomorphism, normative, legitimacy and resource dependency assumptions, respectively.
Frumkin and Galaskiewicz (2004) argue that institutional isomorphism plays a dominant role in public organisations. It posits that organisational change is influenced by three types of pressures: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism (Winarni & Zamakhsyari 2022). In light of this theory, change occurs when institutions face the three types of pressures as described below:
In the case of coercive isomorphism, change occurs when organisations face both formal and informal pressures from the internal and external environments (Schneider, Goldstiein & Smith 1995). Mimetic isomorphism, on the other hand, arises when organisations imitate the actions of others in response to unclear goals or ambiguous procedures (Winarni & Zamakhsyari 2022). In addition, normative pressures refer to the societal expectations and norms that influence organisations to conform to accepted standards and practices within a particular institutional context (Munir & Baird 2016). Normative pressures play a significant role in guiding organisational behaviour and decision-making, as they establish a framework for what is considered legitimate and acceptable within a given environment (Munir & Baird 2016).
In the context of this study, isomorphism as an assumption directly links to the discussion on unstable coalition municipal governments, where these coalitions are bound to experience isomorphic changes as they adapt to shifting political dynamics, societal expectations and power-sharing arrangements.
Legitimacy as an assumption of the Institutional Theory requires organisations or units to strive and uphold legitimacy as it bolsters their reputation, credibility and access to resources (Weidner, Weber & Göbel 2016). In the context of this study, this assumption is relevant as it is applicable to situations where coalitions face challenges in maintaining legitimacy, public trust and their ability to govern effectively.
Resource dependence concentrates on the dependence of units or organisations on external sources for crucial resources like funding, knowledge and expertise, compelling them to forge relationships (Hessels & Terjesen 2008). In the context of coalition governments, where there is no majority lead, this assumption reveals that different political parties are forced to forge relationships with other political parties even when they have ideological differences that can impact their capacity to implement policies and deliver services.
Overall, by applying Institutional Theory to the analysis of unstable coalition governments and municipal administration in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities, researchers can explore how institutional factors shape governance processes, decision-making dynamics and administrative outcomes. This can provide valuable insights for understanding the challenges and opportunities associated with coalition politics at the local level and inform strategies for improving municipal governance and service delivery.
Literature review
Kariuki, Reddy and Wissink (2022:3) are of the view that the philosophy and practice of coalition governments emerged in several Western European democratic countries, particularly the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Belgium and Ireland. A coalition is formed whenever several political factions reach a consensus to collaborate and function to govern as a dominating coalition government (Kariuki et al. 2022:3). Mantzaris (2022:3) asserts that coalition governments are a temporary alliance of groups formed to achieve a common goal. Lijphart’s (1981) early seminal work points out that coalitions pertain to the collaboration of political parties to establish a government in systems lacking a single-party majority in the legislature, to enable power-sharing and facilitate collective decision-making for effective governance. Thus, coalition governments focus more on practical cooperation activities, such as political parties sharing governmental authority. Simply said, coalition governments are political parties that work together in a governing legislative council pursuing a particular goal because of voting results (Booysen 2018:6). In other words, coalition municipal governments arise from failure by a single political party to gain majority council seats leading to two or more parties having to form a government to run the affairs of the municipality.
Wissink and Reddy (2022) point out that the idea of coalitions is now a common concept that originally arose and evolved from the phenomenon of hung parliaments in parliamentary democratic systems. It reflects the need to meet the legal requirement of representing citizens in parliamentary democracies as well as a principle in the human endeavour to achieve common goals and to serve the interests of the respective parties or individuals to achieve desirable and acceptable outcomes.
Wissink and Reddy (2022) further posit that coalitions are often defined by the idea of ‘partnerships of unequal’ and arise from situations of danger, uncertainty or extraordinary situations or events. They emerge with the aim of meeting the interim needs and objectives of running a municipal government.
However, Masiya (2022) cautions that, in practice, coalition municipal governments have been characterised by instability and often terminate before the end of the council term. This instability negatively impacts the functionality of municipalities as coalitions tend to compromise the municipal administration’s ability to provide services. For example, coalition governments in municipalities can easily fail to pass laws or budgets as much of the time is spent disagreeing. Thus, Maneng (2022) acknowledges the mixed effect caused by coalition arrangements on the stability and performance of the municipality and associates the risk of political instability to political parties and municipal councillors.
Sithanen (2003) also confirms that coalitions can be more unstable because inevitably, they experience policy ideology conflict and personality clashes and, therefore, have a shorter life span. While Knowles (2021:131) views emerging coalitions as ‘forced rather than voluntary’, and that instead of being based on a confluence of principles, it merely amounts to ‘power play that is inherently unstable with trust between political parties being balanced on a knife’s edge with no real long-term prospect of surviving’.
From the initial democratic local government elections in 2000 to the fourth local government elections in 2016, so-called ‘hung councils’ have been a recurring feature of the outcomes in South Africa. Beukes and De Visser (2021) maintain that the initial local government elections in 2000 led to ‘29 hung councils’ and the subsequent one held in 2006 resulted in 31, including the City of Cape Town. In 2011, local government elections rose to 37 hung councils, while the 2016 elections resulted in the least 27 hung councils. This led to a high possibility of many coalition deals in the local sphere of government being swiftly entered, with agreements signed and authorised with partial or no thoughtfulness being given to the efficient and flexible local government.
In Gauteng, Mantzaris (2022:218) states that coalition-led metropolitan municipalities started with the City of Tshwane in Gauteng, and the process began in 2016 with the election of the Democratic Alliance’s Mayor Solly Msimanga, ending in 2019. In the 2016 municipal elections, eNCA (2016) stated that ‘Coalitions will be necessary in all the three main metros of Gauteng: Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni due to neither the ANC nor Democratic Alliance (DA) winning outright majorities’. The 2021 municipal elections saw a record number of hung municipalities with approximately 70 councils, where no single party won a majority and coalitions were necessary (Felix 2023).
In the context of South Africa, most of what researchers have explored in this topic are the concepts of political coalitions, coalition governments, multi-party coalitions and multi-party governments. However, much has not been explored on the rising concept of ‘unstable coalition governments and their consequences on municipal administration’, through the lens of the Institutional Theory.
Research method and design
This study used a qualitative approach. Ugwu and Eze (2023:20) say that qualitative research aims to gain a deep understanding of societal occurrences in their natural settings. Agius (2013:204) argues that qualitative approaches intend to disclose what transpires by describing and interpreting events. A qualitative research approach was used to gain a deep and nuanced understanding of unstable municipal coalitions and to allow the researcher to explore the underlying reasons, motivations and meanings behind unstable coalitions. The study uses a case study design. Crowe et al. (2011:1) state that a case study applies a particular case to better understand an issue or phenomenon. A case study design fits into this study because it enables the study to gain more insight into the implications of unstable coalition governments on municipal administration, by analysing coalition governments in the City of Tshwane, Ekurhuleni and City of Johannesburg metropolitan municipalities. Data were collected from secondary sources such as public documents, journal publications, textual and statistical reports, policies and legislation. In this study, all secondary sources were selected based on describing and interpreting the research problem, by considering their reliability, authenticity, meaning and representativeness. To identify and select the most relevant sources on unstable coalition governments and municipal administration, online tools such as Google Scholar, online academic journals and databases were used to search the sources using the keywords ‘coalitions governments’ and ‘municipal administration’. The search was further narrowed down by focusing on the implications of unstable coalition governments on municipal administration in Gauteng metros.
Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data in this study. According to Maguire and Delahunt (2017:3352), thematic analysis is a method of discovering patterns or themes in qualitative data. The goal of thematic analysis is to identify themes or patterns in data and then use them to address the research problem. This study employed the deductive method of thematic analysis and followed all six steps of the process: familiarisation with the data, generation of initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing of themes, defining and naming themes, and writing or reporting of themes. The study used secondary data to build relevant themes in the findings section. The familiarisation step ensured a thorough reading and understanding of the selected sources, establishing a foundation for subsequent analysis. Themes were created by analysing related concepts and were grouped to identify key patterns of the implications of unstable coalition governments on municipal administration in Gauteng metros. Finally, themes were given names to provide a directive for presenting the study’s findings, as discussed below.
Ethical considerations
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of Pretoria does not require an ethical clearance for research conducted by Honours students that are based on secondary sources. The faculty also does not issue any written waiver letters.
Results
This study investigated the implications of unstable coalition governments on municipal administration in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities. The study followed a qualitative research approach using the case studies of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane municipalities. Data were drawn from secondary sources and analysed using thematic analysis. The findings that emerged from the study are discussed in this section.
Delayed municipal decision-making
The study revealed that coalition instabilities affect decision-making. Beukes and De Visser (2021) state that:
[I]nstability in a local coalition can have a severe impact as it may compromise the municipality’s ability to adopt policies and by-laws, make senior management appointments, or even adopt a budget. (p. 4)
According to Madisa (2023), following the 2021 municipal elections, coalitions in Gauteng have been unstable, with the three metros – Tshwane, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni – becoming rotating seats for mayors and executive committees to the disadvantage of citizens. These constant changes in mayoral positions negatively impact municipal administration and service delivery projects. For example, Goba (2023) states that the City of Tshwane coalition failed to meet three deadlines to adopt its revised budget. Tshwane executive mayor Cilliers Brink further asserted that the council’s inability to pass a revised budget had major implications on service delivery.
Beukes Beukes (2020:1) confirms that:
The municipal councils of some municipalities have been paralysed because of deadlocks in the council that made it difficult for the council to pass decisions, adopt budgets and appoint office-bearers and municipal managers. The inability of the council to make these important decisions often adversely affected the delivery of services to communities. (p. 1)
Often, this emanates from the insistence of each political party to include its main policy goals as envisaged in their election manifestos, sometimes leading to the collapse of the coalition. Deputy President Paul Mashantile described coalitions in municipalities as unstable and disruptive (Felix 2023). Further to this, Felix (2023) noted that following the 2021 municipal elections, the DA used its council numbers to form coalitions with political parties, such as the Freedom Front Plus, Cope, ActionSA and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) to govern Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, but the councils saw instability caused mainly by political shifts and desires by the ANC and DA to govern. Gumede (2023) supports this view by arguing that the failure of municipal governments in many cases in South Africa is because of the fact that dominant parties are not making enough compromises, often making smaller parties feel excluded. It is in this context that Booysen (2022:1) argues that anarchism in municipal coalitions is sometimes driven by the intensification of party-political struggle between the ANC, which still dominates South Africa’s politics even though it is in decline, and the biggest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance. She states, ‘The ANC is increasingly conducting coalition wars to retain and regain power while the DA is trying to consolidate its claim to the power that the ANC is ceding’.
Policy uncertainty
Policy uncertainty is also a common phenomenon in unstable coalitions in South African municipalities studied. A high degree of policy uncertainty tends to accompany the changes in coalitions and particularly affects long-range planning instruments that are used to inform operational decisions. For example, this can emanate from the coalition partners’ ideological differences in policy adoption and implementation. A study by Knowles (2021:149) on the DA and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) governing coalitions in the City of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay established that the DA’s position on the land issue served as a major impetus for the EFF to pull its membership from these coalitions, and that the true rift between the two parties began to appear in February 2018 when the DA refused to back the EFF’s motion in the National Assembly regarding expropriation without compensation. Regarding the DA’s lack of support for this motion, the party stated that ‘the issue of land reform has driven the party to turn their backs on their partners in the local municipality’. This illustrates how differences in policy priorities influence policy uncertainty.
On another note, De Vos (2021) notes that in the 2016–2021 period, a DA-led coalition in Johannesburg saw the EFF playing kingmaker and insisting on certain concessions to get their budgets passed. It asked for all previously outsourced personnel contracts to be converted to insourcing resulting in the addition of an estimated 10 000 additional staff to the payroll, as the DA attempted to sustain the marriage of convenience by acceding to the EFF’s populist leanings. This decision was rushed and politically-driven to the extent that service delivery was affected in some departments. Madumo (2023:392) argues that the EFF had not entered into a formal coalition agreement with any party to establish a municipal government; therefore, it is not obliged to completely support the initiatives of the DA-led coalition government. Thus, the situation creates vulnerability in the governance and administration of municipalities and subsequently leads to policy uncertainty.
Therefore, it is argued that these unstable coalition governments affect the execution of municipal strategic plans, operational plans, policies, programmes and initiatives as every party in the coalition has its own vision, which has a ripple effect on the ability of the municipality to remain focused on achieving its original goals.
Lack of political stability
The lack of political stability causes uncertainty of the duration of the term of office of municipal governments and this has emerged as one of the key challenges of municipal coalitions. Often the instability of the municipal government is a symptom of an underlying issue in the coalition government: the inability or unwillingness of coalition partners to work together. Hence, Felix (2023) concludes that the ‘frequent collapse’ of coalitions in local government is deliberate and sometimes not even related to the pursuit of the public good. According to Booysen (2022), frequent collapse is sometimes precipitated by opportunistic, ‘serial flip-floppers’, power-obsessed leaders who run amok and often go wherever the next improved offer of position and patronage-infused municipal portfolio takes them. They anoint and abandon coalitions whenever convenient.
According to Mwareya (2023), the appointment of eight mayors within 2 years in the city of Johannesburg is a tragedy that will affect Johannesburg citizens for years. Sudden changes in mayoral committees are dominant in unstable hung councils because the parties in coalitions fight for political power in the municipal council. When a mayor is removed from the municipal council, he or she vacates the office along with the mayoral committee, meaning that there is a need for the appointment of another set of mayoral committee members under the auspices of a new mayor, who in most cases comes along with his or her new vision for the municipality. Buti (2018) argues that coalitions in unstable municipal governments are often bedevilled by a lack of continuity in policymaking and policy implementation. As a result, when there are sudden continuous changes in mayoral positions, as seen in the City of Johannesburg, it leads to an overall unpreserved accomplishment of the municipal vision, resulting in more delays in the achievement of municipal departmental goals.
Poor municipal human resource practices
One of the duties of municipal councils, as mentioned above, is to employ municipal personnel that are necessary for the effective performance of its functions as per Section 160 (1) (d) of the Constit ution (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996). Section 67 (1) of the Municipal Systems Act of 2005 states that municipalities, in accordance with the Employment Equity Act of 1998, must develop and adopt appropriate systems and procedures to ensure fair, efficient, effective and transparent personnel administration including the recruitment, selection and appointment of persons as staff members (Act 32 of 2000).
However, unstable coalition governments in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities make it difficult for municipalities to ensure the fulfilment of the above-mentioned constitutional obligations, as the recruitment, selection and appointment of municipal personnel are now based on policy interests of political parties rather than on merit. Unstable coalitions are often flagged for politicised illegal appointments of government officials in municipal positions. This was seen in the City of Johannesburg when Cllr Belinda Kayser-Echeozonjoku, a Democratic Alliance caucus leader in the City of Johannesburg, issued a press statement following the Public Protector’s instruction, directing the City to investigate DA concerns about the illegal appointments of leading ANC and Patriotic Alliance (PA) officials in high-paying positions. In the press statement, Cllr Kayser-Echeozonjoku stated ‘Today, we are pleased to announce that the Public Protector (PP) has taken our concerns seriously’. The directive from the Public Protector (PP) makes it clear that the City of Johannesburg must investigate the unlawful employment of PA members, including Mr Charles Cilliers, who held two political offices in the PA while being employed in the municipal administration. This violates recent amendments to the Municipal Systems Act, which prohibits political office-bearers from working in the administration (Kayser-Echeozonjoku 2023).
The illegal hiring of preferred personnel by political parties in unstable environments affects the smooth running of programmes and projects given the frequency of collapse of these coalitions. This also means that municipal officials face job uncertainties as coalitions change. Conversely, employees hired based on support for a particular party may sabotage the work of a new coalition if their party is removed from power. According to Olver (2021), the personnel employed by the previous administration could also present a challenge owing to loyalty to former councillors or the party that led the coalition. Some researchers also point out that during the time when the ANC was in control of most municipalities, their administrations tended to be more productive in the provision of specific services, compared to when it is any other political party Fernandez & Madumo (2022:159). It is likely that the personnel could stifle the progress in the implementation of policy programmes of the new administration and make the city ungovernable and dysfunctional. This is confirmed by a study by Knowles (2021), which established that when a DA-led coalition assumed office in Nelson Mandela Bay, the first challenge they faced was officials who were not willing to assist the DA-led coalition as the administration was highly politicised with key staff having allegiances with the previous administration.
Perpetuation of corruption in municipalities
The study reveals that unstable municipal coalitions are associated with corruption. Mputing (2022) notes that there is a tendency by political parties in unstable coalitions to put their political interest first before that of the electorate. Subsequently, some political parties got into coalitions because they wanted access to municipal resources. This is to the extent that some even dictate who should be the municipal manager or who should be its chief financial officer. Mokgonyana (2023) asserts that inter-party conflicting relations do exist, as coalition governments, which comprise rival political parties who base their decisions on whom they like or do not like, usually control public administration, voting and decision-making. Furthermore, egos get in the way and cause the public interest to be disregarded.
According to section 7 (1) of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, the municipality’s administration, which is also governed by the democratic values and 15 principles embodied in section 195(1) of the Constitution, must take measures to prevent corruption (Act 32 of 2000). The prevention of corruption has proved to be an impossible task in the public sector, especially in unstable coalition governments in Gauteng metros. Unstable coalition governments provide a conducive environment for the perpetuation of corrupt activities in municipalities, because of a municipal administration being under a municipal council made up of members from multiple parties that are not driven by the same goal in the utilisation of municipal resources. Furthermore, municipal resources such as municipal funds or property are easily embezzled because of excessive use of political patronage by political leaders, who often use their power to reward loyal party supporters with government contracts and positions, thereby creating a culture of corruption and cronyism. For example, in the City of Johannesburg, when the ANC-led coalition government took over from the DA-led coalition in December 2019 the then executive mayor, Geoff Makhubo committed to launch an investigation into the ‘fleet contract’, claiming that it has flouted the Municipal Finance Management Act and Supply Chain Processes. The controversial fleet contract was awarded to a company that is alleged to have made payments to an ‘EFF slush-fund’ (Reddy 2020), while the EFF played an instrumental role in installing Mashaba as an Executive Mayor in 2016.
Olver (2021:287) observes that corruption cases were previously reported in metropolitan municipalities under unstable coalition governments because of passivity in financial oversight, an unstable political landscape and the immediate importance of many political agendas all joined to build an ideal environment for corruption to thrive under coalition rule. One of the corruption cases was seen in the Public Protector 2019–2020 report, stating that in 2018, the City of Tshwane Group and Risk Department investigated Ms Marietha Aucamp’s appointment as Chief of Staff in the Office of the Executive Mayor and came to an evident conclusion that Ms Aucamp’s appointment was irregular. Ms Aucamp did not have a B-Tech bachelor’s degree to serve the post, as there was no validation of qualifications before her appointment. The Public Protector 2019–2020 report further asserts that the executive mayor and the interview panel ignored to pay attention to these irregularities and leaned entirely on Mr Shingange, the City’s senior HR official who was directly involved in these procedures. Therefore, this shows the extent of the culture of corruption in unstable coalition government, predominantly in Gauteng metros.
Subversion of the will of the electorate
Section 157 (2) of the Constitution makes a provision for the election of the municipal council members, that it must be in accordance with a system of proportional representation based on that municipality’s segment of the national common voters roll and which provides for the election of members from lists of party candidates drawn up in a party’s order of preference (South Africa 1996). This implies that politicians governing the municipality must be elected from political parties that the local communities voted for. However, in the case that calls for a need for a coalition, the voice of the voters is minimised. As a result, many coalition agreements become severe manipulations of the electorate’s will. It is non-related to democracy whenever a political party with fewer than 1% of the votes is awarded the mayoral chain or the position of speaker’s hammer. This, therefore, is undermining the significance of the electorate’s will. Furthermore, the South African Government (2023) states that when it comes to negotiations, coalition governments are established by political parties and, when relevant, independent representatives, because they must agree to work jointly in the council. Voters, in this case, are not taking part directly in the proceedings and may feel marginalised.
Masilela (2023) observes that the election of Kabelo Gwamanda as Joburg mayor in 2023 was supported by the ANC, EFF and minority parties, by defeating Action SA’s Funzi Ngobeni and former Joburg mayor Mpho Phalatse by 139 votes to 59 and 68 votes, respectively. As stated above, when it comes to negotiations, coalition governments are established by political parties and, when necessary, independent representatives; therefore, this results in the power of the electorate being nullified as the voters are not directly involved in the process, and this was evident in the case of Kabelo Gwamanda’s election as Joburg mayor.
However, the subversion of the will of the electorate to participate directly in such processes gives rise to public rage by citizens located in those municipalities, leading to difficulties for ungovernable citizens. Such responses from Joburg citizens were seen during the election of Thapelo Amad as City of Johannesburg mayor who is the predecessor of Kabelo Gwamanda. According to Patel (2023), Mr Amad only possessed a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in Islamic Sciences when assuming the position of Joburg mayor. This led to hundreds of comments being left on Facebook on the 702 posts resembling Islamophobia, while others questioned his skills and abilities to lead such a large city. One of the comments from Magomarele Thobejane stated, ‘How does someone with a BA in religion know about service delivery in a complex city like the City of Johannesburg?’. The election of Thapelo Amad as Jo’burg mayor, without the direct involvement of the voice of the electorate, shows how difficult it was for the city to govern its local communities under the leadership of Amad as mayor, as he was already criticised immediately after assuming office.
Discussion
The findings of this study shed light on several critical implications arising from unstable coalition governments in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities. Based on the study findings, the implications arising from unstable coalition governments of municipal administration in Gauteng metropolitan municipalities include delayed municipal decision-making, policy uncertainty, lack of political stability, poor municipal human resource practices, perpetuation of corruption in municipalities and subversion of the will of the electorate. All of these consequences confirm the Institutional Theory argument that units or organisations’ equilibria that are self-enforcing can collapse and so induce switching to another equilibrium (Brousseau et al. 2011:3). The same findings also align with the Institutional Theory assumptions of isomorphism, normative, legitimacy and resource dependency.
As an example, the study research underscores how coalition instabilities impact decision-making processes within municipalities. As observed, constant changes in mayoral positions and executive committee rotations have negatively affected the administration’s ability to adopt policies and by-laws, to make senior management appointments and approve budgets. The consequences are evident in instances such as the City of Tshwane, where the failure to pass a revised budget significantly impacted service delivery, emphasising the broader issue of delayed municipal decision-making. This finding aligns with the views of Botha (2022), who argues that coalitions formed at a local sphere are often unstable because they are based on temporary alliances rather than shared principles, values and goals. This ultimately leads to a breakdown in the provision of services. This also aligns with the legitimacy assumption of the Institutional Theory, which is of the view that if organisations fail to strive and uphold legitimacy that bolsters their reputation, this will result in diminishing public trust and reduced ability to govern effectively.
The study found that unstable coalitions contributed to policy uncertainty, hindering long-term planning efforts necessary for operational decisions. The causes include ideological differences among coalition partners, as seen in the cases of the DA and EFF in Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay. This is also true in the rushed and politically-driven decisions, such as converting outsourced contracts to insourcing in Johannesburg, demonstrating how policy uncertainty can negatively affect service delivery and compromise the achievement of municipal goals. This finding aligns with research from Doron and Sened (2001:3–7), who assert that coalitions lead to times of uncertainty, yielding political competition over the goods that the government allocates. This also affirms the resource dependence assumption in Institutional Theory, which states that where relationships are forged despite ideological differences, which can impact organisational capacity to deliver services and implement policies.
The study also highlighted the challenge posed by the uncertainty surrounding the duration of municipal governments in coalitions as a result of the lack of political stability. The study established that frequent collapses characterise coalition governments at present because of the unwillingness or inability of coalition partners to collaborate effectively. This outcome resulted in abrupt changes in mayoral positions, leading to a lack of continuity in leadership and vision, as seen in the City of Johannesburg.
Further, unstable coalitions contribute to poor municipal human resource practices, particularly recruitment and appointment. Where political values precede merit in the appointments, leading to politicised and illegal hiring practices, this creates an environment where municipal officials face job uncertainties, and employees may sabotage the work of new coalitions if their party is no longer in power. A finding confirmed by Kotze (2023) is that in municipalities at present, ‘merit as a prerequisite for senior appointments was replaced by party loyalty’. This supports the coercive isomorphism assumption, which speaks to the pressures of the internal and external environment influencing organisations or units.
The study also revealed a concerning correlation between unstable coalition governments and corruption. The pursuit of political interests over public good, excessive use of political patronage and the ease with which municipal resources are embezzled contribute to a culture of corruption and cronyism. Corruption cases reported in metropolitan municipalities under unstable coalition governments, highlight the lack of financial oversight, creating an ideal environment for corruption to thrive. Corruption is contextual, power-related, hidden or informal and norm deviated (Sudibyo & Jianfu 2015). This confirms normative pressures assumption in guiding organisational behaviour and decision-making, as they establish a framework for what is considered legitimate and acceptable within a given environment (Munir & Baird 2016).
Furthermore, the findings emphasise that the election of municipal council members through proportional representation based on party lists as well as the act of entering or leaving coalitions may undermine the direct involvement of voters. Coalition negotiations and agreements may result in manipulating the electorate’s will, leading to decisions that do not align with the majority’s preferences. The example of the election of City of Johannesburg mayor in 2021, where Al Jam-ah was offered the executive mayor position despite having only three seats in a 270 seats municipality illustrates how coalition governments, formed by political parties and independent representatives, can sideline the direct participation of voters, generating public discontent.
Despite challenges experienced in coalitions at the municipal level, some measures can be taken to improve their stability. Firstly, there is need to create a legal framework within which coalitions can operate. Political parties entering coalitions should be requested to demonstrate that they can get a working majority in a council required to pass important legislation and function as a government before forming a government. Secondly, political parties should publicise coalition agreements to minimise inconsistency in policymaking and implementation. The agreements should state the ways in which positions will be allocated, benefits that will accrue to different coalition partners and the coalition’s policy agenda. Thirdly, training needs to be provided to the political leadership in order to facilitate better and constant decision-making processes through ethical leadership, good governance and accountability, especially in areas with completely new participants. Fourthly, there is a need to ringfence a core set of outcomes that municipalities and cities must deliver, regardless of which coalition government comes into power. This strategy will improve policy consistency and better governance in municipalities. Fifthly, there is a need to develop a universal framework to guide coalition governments to improve alignment with local government mandates. It will be important to ensure that coalition agreements do not contravene the mandate of local government.
Conclusion
The study findings showed that unstable coalition governments affect municipal administration in several ways. Firstly, they erode the foundational principles of democratic and accountable governance. Secondly, the instability adversely affects the provision of essential services. Thirdly, the process of budget formulation and approval is compromised. Fourthly, the precarious nature of political coalitions jeopardises creating a safe and healthy municipal environment and contributes to hung councils. Fifthly, municipal human resource practices are negatively influenced, alongside challenges in effectively managing municipal funds. These are echoed by the assumptions of the Institutional Theory. The challenges underline the need for nuanced and strategic interventions to foster sustainable coalitions in municipal governance, demanding careful consideration from policymakers, municipal officials and citizens alike. There is a critical need for government and municipalities to institute effective legislation and policies addressing the challenges associated with unstable coalition governments in order to foster stability, promoting democratic values and ensuring efficient municipal administration within the Gauteng metropolitan context.
Acknowledgements
This article is partially based on the author’s research essay titled ‘The impact of coalition government instability on municipal administration in selected South African metropolitan municipalities’ towards the Honours in Public Administration degree in the School of Public Management and Administration, University of Pretoria, South Africa 2023, with supervisor Dr Stellah Lubinga. The url was not available at the time of publication.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.
Authors’ contributions
M.P. conceptualised the study, analysed the data and wrote the original draft. S.L. supervised M.P. as a student and provided guidance through the original draft. T.M. strengthened the article, reviewed and edited the manuscript. O.S.M. provided further formal analysis and reviewed the manuscript.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed during this study.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and are the product of professional research. It does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency or that of the publisher. The authors are responsible for this article’s results, findings and content.
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